Central Asia’s Strategic Rebalancing

Taissiya Shegay is a first-year Global Humanitarian Studies student at UCL, with research interests in geopolitics, foreign policy, and Eurasian regional dynamics.

(LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/taissiya-s-8500a129b/)

Introduction

Central Asia has long been viewed as a peripheral region in global politics, but with the development of an increasingly multipolar world, its strategic importance has grown significantly. Particularly, the region's geographic location, resources, and involvement in transregional economic and transport routes have attracted more attention to it.

Following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Germany’s dependence on Russian energy resources began to decrease (like many other European states), and they started to actively seek alternative sources of raw materials, with Central Asia being their next best option. Kazakhstan, in particular, began to supply approximately 10% of the European Union's oil needs, and Germany became a key European buyer of Kazakhstan’s oil. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz's visit to Central Asia and his participation in the "Central Asia+Germany" summit further served as a sign of renewed attention from the West. [1]

Simultaneously, Central Asian countries are using this newfound attention from the EU to diversify their foreign policy and economic ties, improve their own negotiating positions, and strategically balance their existing relations.

Western Re-Engagement with Central Asia

Germany's renewed active engagement with Central Asia in 2024 has shown to be primarily in the economic and resource spheres. Aside from their decreased dependence on Russian resources and increased reliance on Kazakhstan oil, Germany has also shown increased interest in projects like the Trans-Caspian International Transport. [1]

Scholz's three-day tour marked the German Chancellor's first visit to the region in eight years and included a large delegation of German businessmen. In Astana (the capital of Kazakhstan), the "Central Asia+Germany" summit discussed strategic cooperation, trade and economic interaction, and the implementation of joint investment projects. According to official data, Germany remains an important trade and investment partner for Kazakhstan. In the first seven months of 2025, mutual trade volume amounted to $2.3 billion, while direct investment from Germany reached $770 million in 2024, with a significant portion of this investment directed toward the non-resource sector. [2] [3]

However, despite the growth in trade and announced agreements, many investment projects remain largely verbal, and the level of actual implementation remains limited. This creates the feeling that Germany and the EU's interest is primarily driven by the current geopolitical situation and is largely forced, creating an element of uncertainty. [1]

The C5+1 as a Tool of Regional Leverage

The C5+1 summit is a regional diplomatic platform of the US Government plus the governments of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan. Its purpose is to strengthen their coordination, aiming to achieve the shared goal of building an independent and prosperous region that can address common challenges in partnership with the US. [4]

It was founded in 2015, and since then, the platform has facilitated regular ministerial-level meetings, consultations, and thematic working groups focusing on areas such as economics, energy, the environment, and security. In 2022, the C5+1 Secretariat was established to coordinate communications between the governments, identify shared priorities, and plan high-level meetings. [4] [6]

In September 2024, the C5+1 meeting was held in New York with the participation of the heads of foreign affairs agencies of Central Asian countries and the US. The meeting focused on the positive effectiveness of joint work, with trade, economic ties, education, science, humanitarian cooperation, and academic exchange programmes also being discussed. [5] Since 2024, the C5+1 agenda has increased its coverage, from initially focusing primarily on security issues, it has now started to put focus on economic cooperation, trade, and investment. [6]

Central Asia as an Emerging Middle Power Bloc

In 2022, the Russia-Ukraine conflict shook the established world order, and sanctions against Russia and the energy crisis in Europe impacted the development of Eurasia. Because of this, the countries of Central Asia (which have deep economic and political ties with Russia and share the longest land borders with it) reconsidered their role in balancing the interests of external actors, employing the principles of multi-vector diplomacy. [8]

To put it simply, a "middle power" is an actor that is not a great power but is capable of strengthening its position through diplomatic flexibility and expanding partnership networks. For Central Asia, this meant manoeuvring between East and West, with an emphasis on hedging and diversification. But since the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia has increased pressure to retain Central Asia within its orbit and use it for economic purposes, while the West has generally shown an increased interest in Central Asia and is taking steps to establish cooperation. [7]

Central Asian leaders are trying to balance the wants of both the East and the West through a multi-vector approach. It has so far proven quite effective as Central Asian countries are able to maintain sovereignty, avoid secondary sanctions, and attract a wide range of international economic partners. This strategy is a good example of the principle of "agency not alignment,” in which the region acts as an independent actor that utilises geopolitical and geoeconomic changes to expand its foreign policy. [7] [8]

Balancing Russia and China Without Confrontation

Central Asia has historically been within Russia's sphere of influence due to the region consisting of post-Soviet states. Another reason for maintaining a good relationship with the region for Russia is the availability of energy resources. One of the strategies that Russia uses is establishing military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and participating in the training of local security forces. [10]

However, following the Russia-Ukraine conflict, this balance has become quite sensitive. Although close economic ties are still maintained, Central Asian states have shifted their focus to diversifying their international connections, all while still balancing relations with Russia, China, and others. Generally the region has been benefiting a lot from Russia’s economic and political isolation, all while still declaring their intentions to comply with international sanctions. Thus, their cooperation remains, but it is increasingly restrained. [10]

At the same time, China is building a long-term model of cooperation with Central Asia. In the Xi'an Declaration, the parties stated that the development of fruitful, multifaceted cooperation between the Central Asian states and China is in the fundamental interests of all countries. A formal mechanism was established for meetings of heads of state of the Central Asia-China Conference, and there were also considerations of the possibility of establishing a secretariat.

[9] [11]

China had particularly emphasised its presence in infrastructure, energy, digital technologies, and logistics. For Central Asian policymakers this would be a way to attract investment and develop cooperation with a major player without abandoning other foreign policy areas. [12] As a result, Central Asia is not choosing sides but is consistently building a model of interaction based on diverse partnerships.

Conclusion: A Strategic Window, Not a Guarantee

In the context of rapid geopolitical changes, Central Asia is demonstrating a very proactive approach towards the development of their foreign policy. The region utilises the changes in the global balance of powers to expand its own sphere of influence, improving its relations with Russia, China, the West, and other external actors simultaneously. Cooperation with Russia remains primarily in the sphere of security, historical connection and infrastructure codependence. However, after 2022, it became a lot more restrained. In turn, China offers an infrastructural and long-term plan of cooperation, mainly based on the economy and technology, without reliance on formal political alignment. Neither of the two is deemed more important than the other.

At the same time, this strategy raises the question of how sustainable such balancing can remain as geopolitical competition between major powers continues to intensify. Whether Central Asia can preserve this level of autonomy without being pressured into clearer alignment will be a key test of its emerging role.

Thus, Central Asia is viewed as a region that is not heavily inclined towards any side and instead aims to integrate into the international system on its own terms. This allows it to pose itself as an emerging middle-power actor, utilising the competitiveness of larger players to improve its sovereignty, diversify partnerships, and increase their strategic value.

Works Cited

[1] Андреева, Д. (2024) Зачем Олаф Шольц приезжал в Центральную Азию?

[2] Андреева, Д. (2024) Чего Олаф Шольц добился от стран Центральной Азии.

[3] Правительство Республики Казахстан (2024) Федеральный канцлер Германии Олаф Шольц прибыл с официальным визитом в Астану. Официальный информационный ресурс Премьер-министра Республики Казахстан.

[4] US Embassy in Kazakhstan (2022) C5+1 Regional Diplomatic Platform.

[5] Министерство иностранных дел Туркменистана (2025) О министерской встрече в формате «C5+1».

[6] Казахстанский институт стратегических исследований при Президенте РК (2025) Десятилетие сотрудничества Центральной Азии с США в формате «C5+1».

[7] Бор, А. (2025) Игра на два фронта: как Центральная Азия балансирует между Россией и Западом.

[8] Eurasian Research (2022) Внешняя политика Центральной Азии в 2022 году: обзор событий.

[9] Синьхуа (2023) Полный текст Сианьской декларации саммита «Китай – Центральная Азия».

[10] Рахматулин, О. (2023) Россия и Китай: новая геополитическая расстановка сил в Центральной Азии. НИИРК.

[11] Kazakhstan Today (2023) Опубликован текст Сианьской декларации саммита «Китай – Центральная Азия».

[12] Кабышев, Е. and Меляков, В. (2023) Китай и Центральная Азия: сотрудничество или контроль?