China as a “near Arctic state”

Leo Whicker is a History, Politics and Economics student. He has previously interned at Clarksons Research within the maritime infrastructure team.

China’s “Maritime Silk Road” refers to Beijing’s extension of its renowned “Belt and Road initiative”(1). This article focuses on China’s Arctic ambitions, inclduing its “Ice Silk Road”. Polar Shipping Lanes offer substantially shorter maritime routes between South East Asia and Europe. Despite being geographically distant, China characterises itself as a “near-Arctic state”(2). As climate change accelerates ice melt, the Arctic has gained geopolitical relevance, illustrated by Russia’s construction of military bases on Wrangel Island, in the Bering Strait(3). China seeks to benefit from the Arctic sea ice decline, with reduced shipping times making exports more competitive, and access to natural resources could potentially strengthen Chinese energy security. Politically, increased Arctic involvement allows China to enforce further power projection and influence overall regional governance, largely through partnerships with Russia and NGO involvement.

Why is the Arctic relevant?

During the 21st Century, the Arctic has emerged as a region of global importance, notably dubbed by The Economist as climate change’s “greatest opportunity”(4). A once difficult-to-access frontier, it is now a more economically viable region, as Arctic sea ice has shrunk at an estimated rate of 12.2% per decade (5). Beijing has become more active in the region, publishing in 2018 (6) an extensive white paper on its regional strategy. Within this, categorising itself as a “Near-Arcic State” due to its ominous perceived proximity to the region.

Economics: Shipping & Trade

Perhaps China’s core Arctic interest is shipping and trade. The region's growing shipping viability is reflected by an increase of 37% of ships entering the Arctic between 2013-23 (7). The Northern Sea Route could cut journey distances by 40% (8) between East Asia and Europe, potentially saving both time and fuel. Arctic sea routes avoid maritime chokepoints, such as the Strait of Hormuz, where various ships have been seized by the Iranian regime. However, time efficiency gains remain limited. As highlighted by the Arctic Institute, several routes are actually faster via the Suez Canal, including Rotterdam to Singapore. This is largely because overall journey time depends heavily on time spent navigating ice water, which slows ships down considerably (9). At present, Arctic shipping lanes are accessible only 3 months per year; significant journey time reductions can only be realised if routes remain open all year round, implying continuous perfect ice conditions. Whilst it is worth noting that the viability of Arctic shipping currently is limited, if sea-ice decline continues at its current rate, these routes will eventually become more viable.

Energy

The Arctic holds vast untapped natural resources; including,13% of the world’s undiscovered conventional oil resources (10). As the world’s largest crude oil importer, Beijing strives to achieve long-term energy security through diversification away from unstable regions, especially the Middle East. Sanctions, due to the war in Ukraine, have reduced Russian energyexport prices, with Moscow consolidating itself as China’s main LNG supplier (11). Such has been Moscow’s willingness to conduct business with China, negotiations have commenced over a direct pipeline linking China to the Yamal Peninsula (12), within the Arctic Circle. However, growing reliance on Russian Arctic energy risks replacing one form of vulnerability with another, exposing Beijing to political leverage from Moscow and the uncertainties of Arctic infrastructure development.

Political: Governance Influence

China is not an Arctic state; far from it, its northernmost point has a similar latitude to that of Poland. However, Beijing (as a superpower) must exert influence over the region to achieve its long-term economic and energy security goals. To project power, China has invested heavily in research stations in Iceland and Svalbard (13) (which it can do through the Svalbard Convention of 1920). In order to enshrine China’s influence in Arctic decision-making, in 2013 it gained an observer seat within the Arctic Council, gaining regular access to Arctic governance discussions. As well, China has also sought to gain influence as an investor in the Arctic region, especially in partnerhsip with Russia (14). In this example, China provided up to 60% of the capital for the Novatek-run Yamal onshore LNG project in north-western Siberia, signalling clear attempts to gain “smart power” within the Arctic (15).

Military/Security Guarantees

China’s Arctic foreign policy remains officially non-militarised. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, two Arctic states, Finland and Sweden, ascended into NATO. Beijing has thus become Russia’s unofficial partner within the Arctic, without being formally allied. Despite having no territorial claims within the Arctic, in 2024, Chinese and Russian forces conducted a joint strategic bomber patrol near the Alaskan coast (16). This signals China’s ability to project power into the Arctic and operate in extreme environments, without causing significant escalation. However, China’s lack of territorial sovereignty, coupled with the Kremlin still portraying itself as the gatekeeper to the Arctic, means it is cautious to deploy military assets independently of Russia.

China is not an Arctic power by location, it’s engagement within the Arctic is strategic rather than geographic. The “near-Arctic state” framing is a political construct designed to legitimise Chinese involvement. Whilst there are potential long-term gains within shipping, they are yet to be fully realised. However, for Beijing, the more tangible benefits are in energy partnerships. China has no sovereignty or territorial claims within the Arctic; its influence is via institutions such as the Arctic Council and one-sided partnerships with Moscow. Though climate change will continue to open new opportunities, especially within shipping China will most likely remain economically selective and politically constrained within the region. Without territorial sovereignty, China’s role in the Arctic is likely to be opportunistic rather than hegemonic.

Works Cited

1. Arctic Council (2024). Arctic Shipping Update: 37% Increase in Ships in the Arctic Over 10 Years. [online] Arctic Council. Available at: https://arctic-council.org/news/increase-in-arctic-shipping/.

2. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (2025). Why Can’t Russia and China Agree on the Power of Siberia 2 Gas Pipeline? [online] Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/09/russia-china-gas-deals?lang=en

3. Descamps, M. (2019). The Ice Silk Road: Is China a ‘Near-Arctic-State’? [online] Institute for Security and Development Policy. Available at: https://www.isdp.eu/publication/the-ice-silk-road-is-china-a-near-artic-state/.

4. Duplaix, M.D., Alexandre Sheldon (2018). Blue China: Navigating the Maritime Silk Road to Europe – European Council on Foreign Relations. [online] ECFR. Available at: https://ecfr.eu/publication/blue_china_navigating_the_maritime_silk_road_to_europ

5. Future of the Sea: Implications from Opening Arctic Sea Routes Foresight -Future of the Sea Evidence Review Foresight, Government Office for Science. (2017). [online] Government Office for Science. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a74e7aced915d502d6cbf09/Future_of_the_sea_-_implications_from_opening_arctic_sea_routes_final.pdf.

6. Hsiung, C.W. (2020). The Emergence of a Sino-Russian Economic Partnership in the Arctic? [online] The Arctic Institute. Available at: https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/emergence-sino-russian-economic-partnership-arctic/.

7. Kalina Velev (2025). Arctic Sea Ice Minimum Extent – Earth Indicator. [online] NASA Science. Available at: https://science.nasa.gov/earth/explore/earth-indicators/arctic-sea-ice-minimum-extent/.

8. Lee, S.-W. and Song, J.-M. (2014). Economic Possibilities of Shipping though Northern Sea Route1. The Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics, 30(3), pp.415–430. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ajsl.2014.12.009.

9. Nye, J.S. (2023). State Smart Power Strategies. China and Globalization, pp.21–28. doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0714-4_3.

10. S&P Global Energy. (2025). Russia, China deepen energy ties as Western sanctions bite. [online] Available at: https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/crude-oil/112525-russia-china-deepen-energy-ties-as-western-sanctions-bite [Accessed 28 Dec. 2025].

11. The Arctic Institute - Center for Circumpolar Security Studies. (n.d.). China. [online] Available at: https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/country-backgrounders/china/.

12. The Economist (2025). The Arctic: climate change’s great economic opportunity. [online] The Economist. Available at: https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2025/01/23/the-arctic-climate-changes-great-economic-opportunity.

13. The State Council of the People's Republic of China (2018). China’s Arctic Policy. [online] english.www.gov.cn. Available at: https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm.

14. U.S. Energy Information Administration (2012). Arctic oil and natural gas resources. [online] Eia.gov. Available at: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=4650.

15. Weichert, B.J. (2025). Russia Is Quietly Building a New Arctic Military Base—on American Land. [online] The National Interest. Available at: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-quietly-building-new-arctic-military-base-american-land-bw-090325 [Accessed 28 Dec. 2025].

16. Williams, H., Bingen, K.A. and MacKenzie, L. (2024). Why Did China and Russia Stage a Joint Bomber Exercise near Alaska? www.csis.org. [online] Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-did-china-and-russia-stage-joint-bomber-exercise-near-alaska.