UAE: Every Desert Rose Has Its Thorns

Carlos Rangel is a final year Arts and Sciences student. He is especially interested in how international relations affect government policies. (uclqcer@ucl.ac.uk)

Introduction

Dubai chocolate has taken the world by storm in the past year, to the confusion of this writer. I’ve had people from Hong Kong to London to Vancouver ask me about it, given my four years living in Dubai. I had to admit I’d never heard of it prior to being asked about it for the first time in January 2025. What was less surprising to me was that the chocolate was Emirati, the UAE was once again involved in a worldwide sensation. Dubai chocolate is simply the latest example in the UAE’s ambitions to become a regional powerhouse and relevant on the global stage. For it is not merely in chocolate, but in technology and geopolitics that the UAE is asserting itself as a force to be reckoned with.

Historical Background

The United Arab Emirates is a state in the Arab Gulf, nestled between Saudi Arabia and Oman. An ex-British protectorate, it is 56 years old, and until recently, was only known for its oil, gas, and pearl industries[1]. For most of its existence, it remained out of the spotlight, overshadowed by its much larger neighbours Saudi Arabia and Iran. Nevertheless, it has been an unassuming and model US partner: the UAE participated in coalition interventions in Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, and against ISIS[2]. In recent years the UAE has diversified away from fossil fuels, molding itself into a hub of finance and tourism. Additionally, while generally a stalwart ally of the US, it retains flexibility by hedging on the international level by remaining on good terms with Russia and China [3]. The UAE has been particularly active in the last ten years in enhancing its international profile, and working to establish itself as a state whose influence is not limited by its small size.

Soft Power

It is difficult to find someone who has not heard of Dubai. In the public imagination it is a gleaming city full of wealthy people many of whom own golden toilets

(based on a real conversation I had). Conversely, you would be hard-pressed to find an average person capable of naming a city in Oman, Qatar, Yemen, Bahrain, Kuwait, or even Saudi Arabia. This is no accident – the UAE has been positioning itself as the touristic centre of the Middle East. Dubai’s international airport has quickly risen through the ranks of busiest airports, from 19th in 2020 to competing with Atlanta for the position of busiest airport in the world [4]. Ignoring Covid-19, tourism has increased year on year, with 2024 bringing an all-time high of 19 million tourists to the UAE [5].

Moreover, the UAE hosted the 2020 World Expo, has carefully developed the Abu Dhabi Louvre, and has a Sovereign Wealth Fund devoted to investing in culturally relevant foreign assets, like football clubs[1]. Seemingly separate initiatives, they should be conceptualised as a cohesive effort to raise the Emirates’ international profile, given the establishment of a ‘soft power council’ in 2017[6]. According to Brand Finance, a marketing consultancy, they seem to be succeeding, the UAE is 10th in their global soft power ranking, right below Italy (9), but above Spain (13), and Russia(16) [7].

However, the UAE is not just interested in being known around the world. It wants to be a leading player. Hence, the Emirates’ extensive investments in Artificial Intelligence.

The UAE and Artificial Intelligence

After OpenAI changed the world as we know it with its release of ChatGPT, many states raced to develop their own national champions. Among them are Mystral in France, the now infamous Deepseek in China, and FalconAI in the UAE. However, Emirati interest in becoming a leader in AI predated the recent hype – the UAE launched its “Strategy for Artificial Intelligence” in 2017 [8]. Since then, the UAE has followed through; its model is the best functioning Arabic-based AI model [9], and it has struck a plethora of multi-million deals with leading American AI firms, including one building Stargate UAE - the world's largest AI data infrastructure outside the US [10].

The UAE’s ambition to become an AI leader has led to tangible investment and AI-friendly policies such as low regulation [11], incentives to attract international talent like generous AI scholarships [12], and the creation and development of TII, an expert research institute dedicated to digital technology[13]. The UAE recognizes that it can use AI expertise as leverage with other states who have less developed AI infrastructure, knowledge, and networks. In exchange for assistance in implementing AI, housing data, or providing AI tools and knowledge, the UAE can obtain diplomatic support or concessions in other areas[14]. Some may even become dependent on the UAE in their AI use, providing an invaluable tool for future foreign policy.

Geopolitics - East Africa and Yemen

Geographically, the UAE is mostly desert. As such, domestic food supply is scarce; 80% of consumed agricultural products are imported[15]. In fact, apart from fossil fuels, the UAE has little in natural resources so most raw resources are imported[16]. Extensive quantities of said imports come from East Africa[17]. Although other Gulf states face the same issue of food and resource scarcity, the UAE is still the largest regional investor in East Africa. It accounts for 60% of all capital flows from the Gulf, and is the fourth biggest investor in Africa in the world (after China, the US, and the EU)[18].

Another detail of Emirati involvement is its interest in ports: DP World and AD Port Group are two ‘private’ port & logistics companies with overwhelming stakes owned by the Emirati government [19 ] [20]; cumulatively, the companies have obtained concessions to develop or operate over 20 African ports[21]. The purpose is threefold: 1) Strengthen key shipping lanes around the Red Sea and consolidate the UAEs importance as a logistic hub by becoming a ‘gateway’ to Africa. 2) Improve African countries' exporting capacities, given the UAE reliance on African agriculture. 3) A diplomatic tool to develop Emirati-African relations for future political and economic purposes.

Investment and shipping lanes can help explain why two of the world's most intractable conflicts bear the fingerprints of the UAE – Emirati backing of the Rapid Security Forces (RSF) in Sudan, and the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in South Yemen. There is one final ingredient to understand Emirati foreign policy: A deep dislike for Islamic extremism (i.e. Islamism) in all of its forms, and the ruling elite of the UAE considers ‘political Islam’ a form of extremism[22]; Islamism is seen as a threat to stability, and incompatible with a successful, developed society. As such, the UAE champions secular governance - both at home and abroad - influencing foreign policy [23].

As previously mentioned, the UAE has extensive financial interests in East Africa and is also dependent on African agricultural imports; Sudan is central in both respects. The UAE is heavily involved in the Sudanese Civil War, being the main benefactor of the RSF, providing them with weapons and supplies to continue their war against government forces[24]. For one, the UAE dislikes the Sudanese government, due to their links with Political Islam and rejections of additional agricultural deals prior to the war, making the UAE amenable to a change in regime[23]. Additionally, the RSF leadership is personally involved in the trade networks between Sudan and the UAE: Hemedti, the RSF’s leader, has personal contacts within the Emirati government, and has a brother who is a businessman in the UAE[24]. Moreover, the RSF has taken control of gold mines which fund their war – this gold often finds its way to the Emirates, which has a burgeoning gold market. Antipathy to the current regime, paired with extensive investment and a group willing to fight the regime and cooperate with the UAE, is a perfect recipe for subtle intervention; explaining Emirati involvement.

Emirati involvement in Yemen is more longstanding than Sudan; it began with the Saudi-led coalition which aimed to oust Iranian-backed Houthi rebels and restore the Yemeni government[25]. However, the Yemeni government later became more Islamist in nature, adopting politicians with ties to political Islam[25]. This alienated the UAE, leading it to support regional groups directly, namely the secessionist STC, who opposed both the Houthis and the Yemeni government. The STC recently took control of nearly the entire south of the country, which is where the important ports lie[26]. As such, the UAE managed to push back the Houthis, weaken political Islam, and secure vital shipping lanes, through its involvement in Yemen.

Conclusion

The UAE's rise as a regional power is no accident, but the result of deliberate strategy across multiple domains. From soft power initiatives to cutting-edge AI development, the Emirates has systematically worked to transcend geographic constraints and become internationally relevant. Its approach to geopolitics is not merely about maintaining flexibility between global powers, but it is increasingly asserting its own influence to further its interests, resorting to violence if needed. The UAE is exemplary in its rise, but also demonstrates the complexity and strife that often accompanies the rise of new, ambitious nations. Although Dubai chocolate may be as sweet as a rose, every rose has its thorns.

Works Cited

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