Toppling Venezuela’s regime: An Americas-First Foreign Policy
- Vasil Atanasov
- 5 days ago
- 9 min read
Updated: 2 days ago
Vasil Atanasov is a second-year Politics and International Relations student. Passionate about interstate conflict, with a particular interest in understanding the process of conflict resolution and sustainable peacebuilding. (https://www.linkedin.com/in/vasil-atanasov-63a915295/)
Introduction
In recent months, the Caribbean has experienced a buildup that has culminated in the largest U.S. Navy deployment in the region since the Cuban Missile Crisis [1]. When asked whether Nicolás Maduro’s days as leader of Venezuela are numbered, President Trump responded, “I would say yeah.”[2] What began as an increased military presence aimed at combating drug trafficking has since evolved into serious concerns about an impending regime-change operation, in which a ground invasion has not been ruled out [3]. The purpose of this article is to examine the rationale behind this policy and to assess whether there is a broader strategy driving these recent developments.
Background
For most of the 20th century Venezuela was one of the U.S.’s closest allies in the region, due to its anti-communist stance and role as a major oil importer, sitting atop the world’s largest proven oil reserves [4]. That changed, however, with the election of Hugo Chavez in 1998. Since taking power, Chavez and his successor, Nicholas Maduro, have created an authoritarian socialist regime considered responsible for severe economic crises and human rights abuses [4]. A defining feature of the foreign policy since then has been opposition to the U.S., which the government viewed as an imperialist state. Unsurprisingly, relations between the two countries have been deteriorating since the 2000s, as both saw the other as an ideological and security threat [5].
As of the time of writing, however, tensions have reached a historical peak. The United States has reportedly deployed 11 warships and approximately 15,000 personnel off Venezuela’s coast [6]. Since September, it has pursued a policy of bombing suspected drug-trafficking speedboats, which has killed more than 100 people in violation of international law [7]. It has also ordered a naval blockade, which has led to the seizure of two sanctioned Venezuelan oil tankers [8]. All of this against the backdrop of the Maduro regime being charged with narco-terrorism [9]. Given the gravity of the situation, it seems reasonable to ask: What is the logic behind this policy?
Combat Drug Trafficking
Since the beginning of the naval buildup, the Trump administration has repeatedly stated that its aim is to eliminate the flow of drugs from Venezuela to the United States [10]. President Trump and his aides have argued that the Venezuelan drug trade is responsible for the death of tens of thousands of American citizens and therefore constitutes a national security threat [10]. This has manifested into the controversial bombings of supposed drug-trafficking boats in the Caribbean [11]. The roots of this policy can be traced back to February, when the State Department designated Tren de Aragua, a Venezuelan criminal organisation, as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) [12]. A few months later in July, the Treasury sanctioned the Cartel de los Soles, a supposed criminal organisation believed to be headed by Nicolás Maduro himself, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT)[13]. In both cases, the Venezuelan regime was accused of facilitating terrorist activities against the U.S., a claim that has been used to justify the Trump administration’s currently unfolding naval buildup.
However, there has been pushback against this narrative, with critics noting that Venezuela plays a minor role in drug smuggling into the US [14]. With regard to fentanyl – the opioid most responsible for the current overdose epidemic in the U.S. – reports show that there is no connection between Venezuela and fentanyl trafficking [15]. Instead, fentanyl is almost exclusively distributed through Mexico [15]. As for cocaine, the main exporter is Colombia, with Venezuela playing only a secondary role in the smuggling [15]. Additionally, experts point out that the majority of the drug trafficking into the U.S. occurs either through the Pacific or the Mexican border, not the Caribbean, where the navy buildup is concentrated [16].
Furthermore, the notion that stopping drug trafficking requires the U.S. to send every available warship appears rather questionable. Supposedly the navy will not remain hunting for drug boats permanently, as that is a task handled by the Coast Guard. The scale of the operation, in terms of resources, is also inconsistent with the fact that, as shown, Venezuela is not significantly important in the regional drug trade. As such, this does not appear to be a resource-efficient long-term solution. Therefore, it could be argued the military buildup must serve another purpose beyond stopping the drug flow.
Access to Oil
Another explanation is that the U.S. is planning a potential regime change to gain access to Venezuela’s oil reserves, the largest in the world. By this account, the military buildup is there to facilitate U.S. access to Venezuelan oil, either through an agreement or regime change [17]. Trump himself on several occasions has expressed how beneficial it would be to gain access to Venezuela’s oil [18], particularly for the oil refineries in the South, which specialise in the type of heavy crude oil Venezuela produces [19]. The Venezuelan opposition also has stated that opening access to U.S. energy companies would be a priority should it come to power [20]. Finally, the US seized two sanctioned oil tankers, stating it would most likely retain the oil [21].
However, there are two objections to this explanation. First, in October, Nicolás Maduro and U.S. envoy Richard Grenell had reportedly reached an agreement which would have essentially granted U.S. oil companies preferential contracts to the Venezuelan oil industry and redirected oil exports from China to the United States [22]. Essentially, the U.S. would receive exclusive oil access if it let the regime stay in power. The Trump administration reportedly refused this offer, instead choosing to escalate (23). Second, pursuing a regime change to establish control over oil is a highly risky strategy, as the country could descend into chaos, which would undermine prospects of stable oil flow. This is especially the case in Venezuela, where insurgencies would likely emerge [24], threatening both sustained U.S. presence as well as oil extraction efforts. If the access to oil was the sole goal, Trump would be better off going for a diplomatic resolution.
Securing the Americas
Rather than drugs or oil, a more plausible explanation is that the current policy is part of a broader strategy of reasserting U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere. Both the new U.S. National Security Strategy and senior members of the administration have expressed the view that the Western Hemisphere has been neglected, arguing for a more assertive approach [25] [26]. There have been explicit mentions of the idea of adding a “Trump corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, signalling a shift towards a more hawkish policy, particularly towards rogue states like Venezuela [26]. The key figure here is Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who has talked about “An Americas First Foreign Policy” [27] and has long advocated for a tougher stance towards socialist states in Latin America [28]. A regime change in Venezuela could be seen as a domino effect which would critically undermine Nicaragua and Cuba, the latter being heavily dependent on Venezuelan oil supplies [29]. In this scenario, the U.S. government cannot simply negotiate a deal with Maduro; it has to topple the regime itself, which would explain the current diplomatic stalemate.
One driving force behind this more proactive approach in Latin America is China’s growing influence in the region. Over the past two decades, China has established extensive economic and security ties across Latin America, particularly with socialist governments such as Venezuela, a development increasingly viewed as a direct threat to United States national security [30]. Unsurprisingly, China has strongly condemned U.S. actions in the region [31] and, amid the current crisis, released a new policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean outlining plans to further expand its regional presence [32]. From this perspective, the Trump administration likely believes that effectively countering China’s influence—and other potential strategic threats—requires a tougher stance in the Western Hemisphere, beginning with regime change in Venezuela.
Nevertheless, the envisioned strategy faces challenges. First, domestic public opinion is strongly opposed to the use of military force to bring a regime change in Venezuela, which should be no surprise, as Trump was largely elected on the promise of keeping the U.S. out of foreign conflict [33]. This is a serious constraint, as engineering a regime change “on the cheap” with only a navy blockade or aerial bombings is unlikely [34]. Furthermore, pursuing a regime change may backfire and instead push countries closer to China. A hypothetical ground invasion would almost certainly provoke widespread regional opposition, which already exists to some degree, as reflected in the positions expressed by countries such as Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil [35].
Conclusion
To conclude, what is currently at play in the Caribbean is of great significance and could very well translate into a shift in U.S. policy towards the region. The article has put forward the view that the escalation is driven by a new hawkish approach to Latin America, part of it being a regime change in Venezuela. Nevertheless, given the present constraints, only time will tell how successful the administration’s agenda will ultimately prove to be.
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