The Influence of the Oil Lobby on UK Climate Policy

Lexy Reid

INTRODUCTION

The UK government’s stance on fossil fuel usage is remarkably lenient despite the severe climate crisis we face. Policies consistently undermine the net zero goal and exacerbate environmental damage, even when public opinion favours sustainability. This contradiction between the electorate’s desires and their representatives’ actions can be explained by the unchecked influence of the oil lobby.

In his expose The Prostitute State (2014), McCarthy outlines how lobbyists persuaded the coalition government to support nuclear energy expansion (at taxpayer cost), despite their manifestos’ promises to oppose it. This reneging on commitments as a result of lobbying can be directly observed in today’s political arena, as international agreements to reduce emissions are consistently deprioritised at the behest of the oil and gas lobbying giants. This paper will outline the inadequacy of lobbying regulation in the UK, the leniency of current policy on polluting firms, and, overall, how unchecked influence allows democracy to be subverted by lobbyists who prioritise profit margins over environmental health.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The inadequacy of lobbying regulation has allowed special interests to gain undue political influence. Pickard et al. find lobbying legislation so lax it has “loopholes you can walk through” (2025a). A serious failing is the requirement only to report official meetings with lobbyists, whereas “interactions at social events or with special advisers, opposition politicians or more junior officials do not have to be recorded” (Pickard et al., 2025b). Moreover, firms who do not pay UK VAT are exempt from our lobbying laws, catering to wealthy corporations abroad who can lobby for favourable UK legislation without scrutiny. This “patchwork” approach means lobbyists can meet informally with policymakers without their interactions requiring disclosure, thus exerting undemocratic influence over elected officials (Pickard et al., 2025c).

McKay and Wozniak declared that “lobbying regulation in the UK is among the very weakest of countries that have developed lobbying disclosure laws” (2020, pp.2) - the lobbying register lists lobbyists rather than lobbying, “names, targets, expenditure [...] gift-giving or revolving-door employment” are unmonitored and data or notes from meetings actually provided are “almost totally unusable” (202o, pp.15). Their investigation concludes that it is easy for special interest groups, with the necessary funds and government access (given that many lobbyists are simply ex-politicians), to manipulate public policy given the sordid state of lobbying regulation.

FACTORS EXPLAINING GOVERNMENT DEFERENCE

Favourable regulation and lax oversight, however, do not wholly explain how oil and gas giants’ wishes turn into policy outcomes; there must still be something incentivising government compliance. Ironically, just as we ignore environmental damage in favour of material, consumptive gains, so do ministers, political actors and policymakers ignore the sustainability desires of the electorate in favour of the material rewards bestowed by lobbyists.

McCarthy details how currently-serving politicians are bought using lucrative consultancy contracts and highly paid company directorships and how retired politicians, civil servants and regulators are scouted to join lobbying firms so their professional contacts, experience and prestige can be added to the arsenal of influence. Aside from the revolving employment door, politicians can be lobbied via fancy dinners, all-expenses paid ‘fact-finding’ trips and conferences abroad. Furthermore, as past scandals (e.g. PPE during the pandemic) have taught us, the intersection of cronyism and unmonitored lobbying allows politicians’ own financial interests and investments to be used as incentives to pass favourable legislation.

It is important to remember the socio-economic context of these official-lobbyist interactions and where their financial interests lie. The infamous ‘old boys’ network’ is not a shadowy myth but a persistent mechanism by which politico-economic elites influence policymaking. Attendees of the same elite schools and members of the same private clubs have the same financial interests; that is, constant profitable increase. Wealthy politicians on energy company advisory boards and living on energy company dividends have little incentive to pass environmentally-friendly legislation, and even less incentive to properly report their interactions with lobbyists who share those interests. For example, McCarthy exposes how twenty-five separate Lib Dem MPs earned huge salaries from employment in the fossil fuel sector, yet are still accepted to advisory committees on energy policies.

While officials may claim high installation costs of renewable energy sources and economic significance of a thriving fossil fuel sector as the reasons for continued lenience, this article argues it is those pulling the invisible, lucrative strings that truly explain inadequate environmental policy.

POLICY OUTCOMES

The government thus continues to push policies mysteriously favouring oil and gas, such as issuing oil and gas exploration licences (Reuters, 2025), weakly enforcing its climate compatibility checkpoints to facilitate this expansion (UKGOV, 2022) and giving priority to oil and gas in future energy planning (FoE, 2025). Meanwhile, a government survey finds that 80% of the British public supported using renewable energy like wind, solar, and biomass (UKGOV, 2025). The existence of undemocratic, unchecked influence is evident.

The 2022 oil and gas windfall tax provides a perfect example of how opaque lobbying leads to undue policy influence and damaging outcomes. “The windfall tax became law in July 2022, a temporary 25% tax (bringing the total tax rate up to 65%) - but with a ‘generous’ 80% investment allowance. This loophole meant that for every £1 oil and gas companies invested in UK extraction, they could claim a total of 91p in tax relief. The Institute for Fiscal Studies called this a ‘huge tax subsidy’ that can incentivise economically unviable oil and gas projects, by enabling massively loss-making investments to still be profitable after tax” (FFP, 2023a). The investment allowance in combination with other energy company tax exemptions meant that, by October 2022, Shell paid £0 of windfall tax despite record profits.

How does a policy meant to curtail fossil fuel use enable its discounted facilitation? This is the work of the OEUK fossil fuel lobby (representing household names such as Shell, BP, Equinor and TotalEnergies), who ensured the legislation was as industry-favourable and loophole-ridden as possible. “OEUK and its operator members had twice as many meetings with Government Ministers in June 2022 as it did in the month before or after [...] a summer reception at Parliament organised under the auspices of an OEUK-affiliated All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) gave the oil and gas lobby an incredible opportunity to lobby MPs and Ministers against the windfall tax” (FFP, 2023b). While the official public consultation period was a week, leading to outcry from climate activists who highlighted the limitations on opposition, lobbyists for the energy sector had countless private meetings with policy officials to push their agenda. Weak tax enforcement then caters to the profitability of energy conglomerates while leaving the British public to foot the bill of a windfall tax actually acting as a subsidy.

Critics may argue that the policies of the past Conservative government, whose corruption was well-documented, does not prove continued unchecked influence of energy lobbyists. However, not only does the criminalisation of climate activism groups show that this alliance continues, but Taylor (2025a) finds that “government ministers met representatives from the fossil fuel industry more than 500 times during their first year in power – equivalent to twice every working day, according to research.” Moreover, during this same first year, fossil fuel lobbyists were present at 48% more ministerial meetings than the Conservative Party. Boughton suggests “these lobbyists should have no place in ministerial meetings about the energy transition, taxing profits or cutting our bills – it’s in their interest to sabotage these talks” (cited by Taylor, 2025b).

The March 2025 energy consultations published by the government boast a proposed end to the windfall tax and maintenance of existing oil and gas fields “for their lifespan” (UKGOV, 2025). This favouritism, prima facie, may seem insignificant compared to the clear Conservative alliance with oil and gas, but these measures continue two damaging strands of rhetoric. Firstly, that oil and gas profits must remain high in order keep bills low. This is counterintuitive on a basic economic level as deregulation has been historically proven to harm, not help, consumers. Secondly, that oil and gas must be allowed to reach the end of its natural lifetime before we transition to clean energy. This only ensures that fossil fuel conglomerates become even more vital in the transition as they are allowed to keep their energy market monopoly, rather than subsidising new, sustainable entrants. As long as this rhetoric remains in the public vocabulary, the issue of climate damage becomes less and less pressing. Politicians can reap the material rewards of deferring to corporate commands while public awareness of the vitality of a clean energy transition diminishes.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

On Thursday 19th June 2025, French researchers (formerly authors of for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) declared, “collectively and unequivocally for the first time: The goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, established by the Paris Agreement on climate change 10 years ago, ‘is no longer attainable’” (Garric, 2025). If current emission levels continue, extreme weather and natural disasters will only worsen, food insecurity and poverty will rise, and migration fluxes will intensify. If lobbying continues unimpeded, allowing over-representation of the energy sector’s interests and disproportionate, undemocratic policy influence, this apocalyptic future simply draws closer.

Serious reform is needed regarding UK lobbying oversight to prevent corporate interests from determining policy outcomes. Boardman (who investigated Cameron’s lobbying scandal during the pandemic) recommended “greater transparency on the content of meetings, such as details of the policy area and specific regulations, legislation, or funding under discussion” (Pickard et al., 2025d). None of his recommendations were implemented, perhaps because they are not radical enough; the issue is not undisclosed gifts or after-hours meetings, but symbiotic corruption between the upper echelons of the public and private sector. True lobbying reform must also target the closed doors (members’ clubs, private school-government pipelines, the unelected legislature House ) which prevent public will from being represented in public policy.

CONCLUSION

The disconnect between public, pro-sustainable will and the government’s immovable favouritism for energy conglomerates is no mystery; it is beneficial for everyone who is allowed behind the ‘closed door.’ When politicians and lobbyists share interests diametrically opposed to the public’s well-being, we must target their connection, not the oversight regarding one involved actor, if we want tangible improvement. The corrupt dynamics currently at play damage the UK’s credibility in climate negotiations, undermine our role as a leader of the Paris Agreement and erode our soft power repertoire with external corporate obligations.

To conclude, the influence of the UK oil lobby on climate policy is pervasive, invisible and, most importantly, undemocratic. It must be public opinion leading the charge for the future, not private corporate interests dooming us to repeat the mistakes of the past.

Works Cited

1. Donnachadh, M. (2014) The Prostitute State. Three Acorns Publications.

2. Fossil Free Parliament (2023) UNCOVERED: How opaque groups and privileged access enabled the fossil fuel industry to derail the windfall tax. Available at: FossilFreeParliament_research_OEUK_lobbying_windfall_tax.pdf (Accessed: 27/12/2025).

3. Friends of the Earth (2025) ‘Government urged to end fossil fuel bias in planning rules.’ Available at: Government urged to end fossil fuel bias in planning rules | Friends of the Earth (Accessed: 24/12/2025).

4. Garric, A. (2025) ‘Limiting global warming to 1.5°C is now impossible’, Le Monde, 19 June. Available at: Limiting global warming to 1.5°C is now impossible (Accessed: 19/12/2025).

5. McKay, A. and Wozniak, A. (2020) ‘Opaque: an empirical evaluation of lobbying transparency in the UK’, Interest Groups and Advocacy, 9(1), pp.2-15. Available at: Opaque: an empirical evaluation of lobbying transparency in the UK | Interest Groups & Advocacy (Accessed: 18/12/2025).

6. Pickard, J. et al. (2025) ‘‘Loopholes you can walk through’: UK lobbying industry calls for tighter rules’, Financial Times, 25 April. Available at: Subscribe to read (Accessed: 23/12/2025).

7. Reuters (2025) ‘UK court dismisses challenge to issuing of oil and gas exploration licences’, Reuters, 28 November. Available at: UK court dismisses challenge to issuing of oil and gas exploration licences | Reuters (Accessed: 21/12/2025).

8. Taylor, M. (2025) ‘Labour ministers met fossil fuel lobbyists 500 times in first year of power, analysis shows’, The Guardian, 16 October. Available at: Labour ministers met fossil fuel lobbyists 500 times in first year of power, analysis shows | Lobbying | The Guardian (Accessed: 18/12/2025).

9. UK Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (2025) ‘Building the North Sea’s energy future.’ Available at: Building the North Sea’s energy future - GOV.UK (Accessed: 19/12/2025).

10. UK Government (2022) ‘Climate compatibility checkpoint design.’ Available at: Climate compatibility checkpoint design - GOV.UK (Accessed: 21/12/2025).

11. UK Government (2025) ‘DESNZ Public Attitudes Tracker: Headline findings, Spring 2025, UK.’ Available at: DESNZ Public Attitudes Tracker: Headline findings, Spring 2025, UK - GOV.UK (Accessed: 26/12/2025).