Sanseitō’s Revitalisation of the Japanese Far Right

Elizabeth is a second-year undergraduate student from Canada studying English and Hong Kong law. Her particular areas of interest are in medical negligence and copyright law. Beyond her degree, she is passionate about 1400s-1700s world history and human geography.

The Imperialist Pipeline

In July 2025, Sanseitō, a fringe political party once confined to the radical corners of the internet, experienced an unprecedented surge in popularity among voters. Sanseitō gained 14 new seats in the House of Councillors election, a stark increase from the 3 seats it held in 2024. Now firmly established in the Upper House of the National Diet, it is the fourth-largest oppositional party against the Liberal Democratic Party-Komeito coalition government. [1]

Sanseitō’s nickname is the ‘Do It Yourself Party,’ and its grassroots image is certainly appealing to voters disillusioned by the leading parties. Sanseitō was founded on YouTube in 2020, before the pandemic. It gained traction during the pandemic by perpetuating anti-vaccination and ‘deep state’ conspiracy theories, eventually securing formal political footing in 2022. [2] Sohei Kamiya, a founder of the party and its current Secretary-General, believes in a ‘Japan-First’ policy model based on the nationalist sentiments of US President Donald Trump. [3]

Conservatism is not a new phenomenon in Japan; rather, it is founded on the philosophies of the Meiji era. During the early Meiji decades, ideas from the Enlightenment, such as utilitarianism, were adopted. Conservatism emerged as a response, rejecting growing Western influence as a threat to the rigid Japanese social hierarchy and culture. This era of Japan was a swinging pendulum between modernisation to keep pace with European dominance and protecting traditionalist values. Both aspects of the pendulum share a fundamentally nationalist philosophy that remains at the core of Japanese politics. [4] Prominent Japanese thinkers like Fukuzawa Yukichi envisioned themselves as people equivalent to the colonial ‘white race’ and distant from their East Asian counterparts, which they believed to be less ‘civilised.’ [5] This sense of superiority informed Japan’s colonial ambitions. When Japan held authority in Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria, they operated on a ‘same but separate’ ideology, meaning a hegemonic Asian race was promoted, but Japanese citizens remained economically and socially superior to the natives. Officially, Japan was freeing the ‘lesser’ Asian populations from the West; in reality, aggressive assimilation measures were enacted, and locals were often used for cheap labour for the benefit of the mainland. [6] Indeed, Japan has always been ‘Japan-First,’ so it is no surprise Sanseitō has garnered support by advertising itself as the most nationalist party.

Currently, 5 of the 9 most prominent members of the Diet’s Upper House are right-leaning. The incumbent prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, reflects Japan’s recent trend of further retreat into traditionalist politics. Despite being the first female prime minister, she does not identify as a feminist. [7] She holds traditional gender values (such as women taking on their husbands’ last names), opposes same-sex marriage and denies Japan’s crimes against humanity during WWII. [8] Beyond social conservatism, she advocates for tighter immigration restrictions, believing that foreigners would severely disrupt safety and structure. Notably, a survey conducted by a Japanese newspaper in November 2025 indicated that 66% of voters believed that the Takaichi administration’s immigration policies are ‘promising,’ with this sentiment most prominent amongst young men. [9] Similarly, Sanseitō is a staunchly nationalist, hardline-conservative party. Opponents have accused Kamiya of xenophobia, anti-Semitism and homophobia, though such sentiment seems to be his largest point of appeal.

‘Angry Young Men Symptom’

Sanseitō’s party slogan makes it clear who their target demographic is:

投票したい政党がないから、自分たちでゼロからつくる

(Since there is no party you want to vote for, we will create our own from scratch)

Sanseitō occupies a unique position in politics due to its large internet presence. In 2025, 46.9% of voters used social media and video-sharing sites for information to decide which party to vote for. Of the voters relying on social media, 23.9% voted for Sanseitō, with the incumbent LDP lagging behind at only 11.5%. [10] Sanseitō has 191k followers on Instagram and over half a million YouTube subscribers, whereas many other competing parties have not yet made their online debut.

The influence of social media on the youth vote cannot be understated, as young people are more likely to rely on online information to inform their political stance. The algorithm works in favour of Sanseitō’s sensationalist ideologies; it is easy to get caught up in a rabbit hole of conspiracies. Reactionary outrage is often most easily accessible for voters to grasp onto. Kamiya presents a ready target for angry voters unsatisfied by previous governments’ response to COVID and Japan’s stagnant economy— foreigners unjustly enriched by Japanese resources. By blaming higher costs of living and stagnant wages on tourists and immigrant workers, Sanseitō is most popular amongst young male voters aged 18 to 39. [11] Leading public opinion and research company Nanos Research called this phenomenon ‘angry young symptom.’ Blue-collar young men are more likely to be radicalised through social media platforms due to the echochamber mechanism of the algorithm [12]. Gen-Z are already disadvantaged around the world due to an ever-growing affordability crisis, and young men who aren’t concerned with gender-specific social issues turn towards conservative politicians that prioritise their demographic (or at least rhetorically speaking).

Regional and Global Consequences

The Takaichi administration has already worsened relationships with China. Japan has increasingly pulled back from its usually pacifist foreign policy and approved a record-breaking defense budget of over 9 trillion yen (around £43 bn) for 2026. Takaichi also stated during the budget proposal that a potential Chinese blockade of Taiwan would be an existential threat for Japan, which would be grounds for a military response from Japan and allies [13]. Along with Takaichi’s own revisionist beliefs on Japanese war crimes, pre-existing tension with China that has existed for hundreds of years has escalated quickly. In retaliation, in November 2025, China mobilised its coast guard and military drones to unoccupied islands claimed by both China and Japan in an effort to gauge a response. On January 6th, China’s Ministry of Commerce prohibited the export of all dual-use items (items used in both military and civilian spheres) to Japan, including rare earth minerals. Although the Takaichi administration denied that this would have a grave effect on Japan, Japan still relies largely on Chinese mineral exports [14]. This nationalist movement in Japan could alienate its allies and further anger its neighbours, putting its increasingly frail economy at risk.

On a larger scale, Sanseitō and Takaichi’s rise are microcosms of a remarkable shift to conservatism amongst democracies worldwide. According to Reuters, a gender divide in politics is intensifying among Gen-Z. Young men are more likely to vote for right-wing parties, while young women are more likely to vote left. The trend departs from pre-pandemic years, when both Gen-Z men and women were more likely to be left-leaning. Some academics attribute this to post-pandemic uncertainty, leading people to turn to charismatic, conservative leaders in response to rapid change and economic deterioration. The gender divide is particularly prominent in East Asian countries, including South Korea and Japan, where gender hierarchies were more divisive to begin with. Many men saw women as a convenient scapegoat for social problems that seemed too big to address otherwise [12].

Despite its current popularity, Sanseitō’s longevity in the Japanese political consciousness is not guaranteed. Charismatic leaders like Kamiya don’t always make good policymakers. His goals to make Japan completely self-sufficient, vastly limit immigration and eliminate vaccinations are lofty and unrealistic. Parties are aware of the importance of the youth vote, and the LDP is already strategising on gaining more favour, such as recently launching their brand new social media platform. Like many other sensationalist fringe groups around the world, it will take more than aspirational messaging for Sanseitō to take root. Online popularity will not always reflect in elections, and Sanseitō supporters could very well turn to other radical groups that will inevitably emerge. Since the LDP has become much more right-wing since the Takaichi administration, it is likely that Sanseitō will slowly be pushed out of its niche. [10] Sanseitō’s electoral history is too brief to indicate a trend, and its future remains to be seen in future elections.

Works Cited

[1] Oman Al Yahyai (2025). Far-right party emerges as fourth-largest opposition force in Japan. [online] euronews. Available at: https://www.euronews.com/2025/07/21/far-right-japanese-first-party-sanseito-emerges-as-fourth-largest-opposition-force-in-parl

[2] nippon.com. (2025). Sanseitō Makes a Splash: Populist Politics on the Rise in Japan. [online] Available at: https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d01154/ [Accessed 11 Jan. 2026].

[3] Butler, G. and Khalil, S. (2025). Japan election: PM vows to stay on despite bruising election loss. BBC News. [online] 20 Jul. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c8xvn90yr8go.

[4] Pyle, K.B. (1998). Meiji Conservatism. Cambridge University Press eBooks, pp.98–146. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511626067.003.

[5] Zohar, A. (2020). Introduction: Race and Empire in Meiji Japan. [online] The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. Available at: https://apjjf.org/2020/20/zohar.

[6] L, A. (2022). Imperial Gateway: Colonial Taiwan and Japan’s Expansion in South China and Southeast Asia, 1895–1945 - The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. [online] The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. Available at: https://apjjf.org/2022/17/shirane.

[7] Reynolds, I. (2025). Japan Has Its First Woman Leader. Just Don’t Ask Her About Feminism. [online] Bloomberg.com. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-10-22/sanae-takaichi-is-japan-s-first-female-leader-but-equality-remains-elusive?embedded-checkout=true [Accessed 11 Jan. 2026].

[8] GoodSoft (2025). PISM. [online] Pism.pl. Available at: https://pism.pl/publications/takaichi-sanae-set-to-become-japans-prime-minister [Accessed 11 Jan. 2026].

[9] The Asahi Shimbun. (2025). Survey: 66% back Takaichi’s tougher policies on immigration | The Asahi Shimbun: Breaking News, Japan News and Analysis. [online] Available at: https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16162590.

‌[10] Pacific Forum. (2025). Explore Pacific Forum’s Insightful Indo-Pacific Analysis. [online] Available at: https://pacforum.org/publications/yl-blog-148-japan-first-the-recent-rise-of-the-far-right-in-japan-and-the-future-of-japanese-politics/.

[11] Yeung, J. (2025). How did a right-wing populist party that began on YouTube win big in Japan’s recent election? [online] CNN. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2025/07/21/asia/how-did-a-far-right-party-that-began-on-youtube-win-big-in-japans-recent-election.‌

[12] ‌Jung, H., Bendeich, M. and Escritt, T. (2025). How a Gen Z gender divide is reshaping democracy. Reuters. [online] 29 May. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/how-gen-z-gender-divide-is-reshaping-democracy-2025-05-29/.

[13] Jazeera, A. (2025). Japan gov’t greenlights record $58bn defence budget amid regional tension. [online] Al Jazeera. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/26/japan-govt-greenlights-record-58bn-defence-budget-amid-regional-tension.

[14] Davis, R.A. (2026). China’s Threat to Block Rare Earths Has Put Japan on High Alert. The New York Times. [online] 7 Jan. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/07/business/china-japan-rare-earths.html.