Tanzania’s Hollow Democracy

Aamena Dhanji is a first year Politics and International Relations student. She is a member of the BBI and an Avicenna Scholar, available at http://linkedin.com/in/aamena-dhanji

Introduction

On the 29th of October 2025, Tanzania went to the polls. What was meant to be a routine act in the name of democracy led to a nationwide curfew, an internet blackout and a violent six-day crackdown, which saw the killings of several protestors, with many of their bodies since unreturned to their families. Tanzania was once described as an ‘Island of Peace’ (Onyango-Obbo, 2025), yet the hazy details surrounding the re-election of President Samia Suluhu Hassan with a reported 98% majority (UN, 2025) indicates the opposite: Tanzania’s democracy has been crumbling, and this election may have been the final straw.

The 2025 Election And The State Response

Protests broke out on election day as voting got underway, triggered by presumed electoral manipulation (Paget, 2025) by the CCM (Tanzania’s dominant political party) and anger at Hassan’s effortless re-election. Despite spreading across multiple towns, the scenes on display indicate that the protests were minimally organised; this was not a revolution, nor a carefully organised event- protestors were armed with “cellphones and guts” (Paget, 2025) and little else. The force with which the state responded suggests the opposite. The country was plunged into a digital shutdown and a nationwide curfew was put in place (UN, 2025), meaning the details of the following events are hard to ascertain due to a lack of video evidence. However, eyewitness accounts and investigations by organisations such as Amnesty International point to what has been described as a massacre, with state authorities showing “a shocking disregard for the right to life and for freedom of peaceful assembly” (Amnesty International, 2025).

The days after the election saw protestors killed at scale. Police officers, as well as “unidentified men in plain clothes” (Paget, 2025), shot into crowds with little regard for who was hurt. Amnesty International found that security forces “used firearms recklessly” and fired at individuals “who posed no imminent threat of death or serious injury” (Amnesty International, 2025), meaning even those who attempted to protest peacefully were treated with violence. They shot at protestors and they shot at bystanders (Paget, 2025) and seemingly they did so unashamedly; there were strong police presences in hospitals who eyewitnesses claim warned staff about speaking out about what happened or risk facing treason charges. One account from a Dar-es-Salam healthcare professional reported “that the officers ordered medical staff to hand over at least five severely injured patients who had gunshot wounds, while they were still bleeding, ostensibly for interrogation. The five were wearing the opposition CHADEMA party uniforms or T-shirts. He never saw those patients again” (Amnesty International, 2025).

Although the protests were largely quashed by the fourth day, their impact continues to be felt, particularly by the families of victims. The ONHCR (2025) stated that reports suggest that “security forces transported the bodies of some of those killed to undisclosed locations”, meaning that many families were denied a final goodbye. Bodies were taken from morgues and hospitals and there have been no answers, with one family resorting to burying “the clothes and picture” (Amnesty International, 2025) of their loved one as a final resort.

Crushing Dissent Before The Vote

Looking closer at Hassan’s extreme majority, it is clear that this was not a spur-of-the-win moment but rather the culmination of many factors building up to the election period. One of the primary causes of her victory was the fact that every credible opponent was arrested or excluded from the ballot. The leader of Chadema (the main opposition party), spent the election campaign being tried for treason and was therefore unable to run, whilst other candidates like Luhagha Mpina (candidate for ACT-Wazalendo) were disqualified on technicalities and were obstructed from campaigning. This left many voters no real choice but the re-election of the already ruling CCM party, with these tactics serving as clear evidence of democratic erosion within Tanzania’s political system. Hassan was declared the winner with an implausible 97.6% of the vote, with ballot-rigging so apparent that the African Union concluded that the election “did not meet democratic standards” and that the government had “compromised electoral integrity” by failing to comply with AU principles (Westcott, 2025).

The CCM has been the ruling party since 1961 and has always operated on a platform of popular legitimacy, claiming to govern in the interests of the people. This was the case for many years as they worked to instil their popularity in the minds of Tanzanians through performing at mass rallies and placing hundreds of party flags and offices in every neighbourhood. Sustained protest has not been a common feature in Tanzanian politics, which may help to explain the unprecedented response from the government. Paget (2025) proposes that the CCM has now completed an authoritarian turn that began over a decade ago and has now reached its peak, arguing that their violent response was an attempt to “prevent a new era of protest from emerging”. Although the state succeeded in quashing the immediate outbursts, a party that claims to act on behalf of its people while turning violently against them may be the tipping point for Tanzanians who no longer identify with an increasingly authoritarian regime.

Surprisingly, Hassan has announced a commission of inquiry into the killings of protestors (Amnesty International, 2025) in an apparent attempt to deliver accountability. However, for meaningful justice to occur, the commission would need to be both independent and incorruptible- two features which are highly unlikely given the current political context. Instead, trust in the Tanzanian electoral process is likely to continue to decline, as it is clear that the CCM will hold onto power regardless of the cost.

Conclusion

This election is not just a one-off, but reflective of a broader global erosion in electoral norms and a growing tolerance of authoritarianism that often goes unchecked. Tanzania’s electoral crisis should not be understood in isolation. The CCM has ruled for over half a century and yet the speed with which it seemed to resort to violence was unprecedented. In doing so, the party has undermined its long-standing claim to popular legitimacy and has tainted Tanzania’s reputation as a functioning democracy. Recognising and scrutinising these events are imperative in a time where global democracy continues to come under threat.

Works Cited

African Arguments (2025) Is the CCM losing Tanzania? Available at: https://africanarguments.org/2025/12/is-the-ccm-losing-tanzania/

Amnesty International (2025) Tanzania: security forces used unlawful lethal force in election protest crackdown and took away dead bodies. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/12/tanzania-security-forces-used-unlawful-lethal-force-in-election-protest-crackdown-and-took-away-dead-bodies/

Journal of Democracy (2025) Tanzania will never be the same. Available at: https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/online-exclusive/tanzania-will-never-be-the-same/

Nation Africa (2025) The tortoise that fell from the sky. Available at: https://nation.africa/kenya/blogs-opinion/opinion/the-tortoise-that-fell-from-the-sky--5254124#google_vignette

OHCHR (2025) Tanzania: deaths and injuries amid election-related protests. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2025/10/tanzania-deaths-and-injuries-amid-election-related-protests

The Guardian (2025) Tanzania: Africa governance and human rights. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/nov/18/tanzania-africa-governance-human-rights-tanzania-samia-suluhu-hassan-uganda-drc-rwanda-sudan

UN News (2025) Tanzanians protest re-election; violence and missing persons reported. Available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/11/1166334