Sanae Takaichi: Japan’s first female Prime Minister

Hana Kameyama is a second-year Politics and International Relations student.

Who is Sanae Takaichi?

Sanae Takaichi, known for her background in taking on various ministerial roles, including the Minister of State for Economic Security, a TV host, and a drummer in a heavy metal band, was elected as the first woman to serve as Japan’s prime minister on the 21st of October, 2025. Expressing desires to become Japan’s Iron Lady, she is a hard-line conservative member of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) [13]. At an unstable time for the LDP, her election was welcomed by its members, who saw it as a way to regain support from conservatives they had lost, particularly to the far-right Sanseito party with a ‘Japan First’ campaign [13]. She positions herself as the late Shinzo Abe’s successor, pledging to revive his “Abenomics” economic vision of high public spending and cheap borrowing, and take a more assertive stance in the international arena [4] [13]. Her policies include strategic investments in specific core fields such as AI and semiconductors to boost economic growth and prepare for potential crises, revising Japan’s pacifist constitution, and becoming more militarily independent and less reliant on the US [4] [10]. Her decision to raise the income threshold of which income tax applies is especially popular among young voters, evident in the 92.4% approval rating for the cabinet among 18-29 year olds as of December 2025 [9]. The question now is, what changes would she potentially bring about, and what challenges does her government face?

A New Leader

As the 104th Prime Minister of Japan and the first woman to hold the office, her election was a milestone, as Japan ranked 125th/148 in the Global Gender Gap Report's political empowerment index [11]. However, despite this, there are doubts about her breaking the glass ceiling and empowering women, even being called “an honorary man” [12]. This stems from her stance opposing initiatives for gender equality, such as optional separate surnames for married couples and same sex marriage [12].

Although her appointment would most likely result in a jump in the political empowerment rankings, from her past opinions, it is doubtful that there would be any significant change at the root of the problem, with strong gender norms ingrained in society, and structural barriers for women to enter the very male-dominated political sphere. Still, having a woman as the leader could symbolise the gradual generational shifts that have occurred and create opportunities to explore new perspectives on women in leadership positions.

Another drastic change is the formation of a coalition with the Japan Innovation Party (Ishin). Following the end of its 26-year-old partnership with Komeito since 1999, the LDP turned to Ishin instead, to ensure Takaichi’s election [1]. To avoid a prolonged political vacuum, the LDP and Ishin agreement was extremely rushed, with the LDP largely accepting Ishin's demands while unresolved stances between the two parties remained [8].

Ishin started as a local political party pushing for a stronger position for Osaka at the national level. Thus, its policies aim to address excessive power concentration in Tokyo. Some of Ishin’s demands in the agreement included proposals to make Osaka Japan’s secondary capital, reduce the number of Diet seats, and reform social security. Unlike during the LDP-Komeito era, when Komeito served as a constraint on ambitions to enhance Japan’s military capabilities, the LDP-Ishin coalition could pursue more proactive foreign and security policies that align more closely with Takaichi’s approach.

Although it is framed as a coalition, Ishin does not share cabinet positions with the LDP, unlike the LDP-Komeito coalition. Recently, the instability of this “non-cabinet coalition” government was exposed, with the Ishin leader Yoshimura hinting at withdrawing from the coalition over the issue of reducing the number of House of Representatives seats [8].

In addition to this already precarious coalition, another primary concern for the Takaichi government is that this coalition government holds a minority in the House of Councillors and barely holds the majority in the House of Representatives. Having a majority in the House of Representatives is particularly important given its constitutional supremacy, including the power to pass budget bills automatically 30 days after they are sent to the House of Councillors and to refuse a no-confidence motion against the cabinet. However, if even a single member of the coalition government decides to disagree, it could lose its majority again. Thus, the LDP would need continuous effort, urging independent voters to join their causes [7].

If Takaichi continues to enjoy high approval ratings, sometime in 2026, she may choose to dissolve the House of Representatives and hold a General Election in hopes of gaining more seats and achieving a more stable, long-term administration. However, since the ruling party would remain a minority in the House of Councillors, careful coordination with Ishin, as well as potentially collaborating with opposition parties, would be necessary regardless.

Concerns

A significant concern for the Japanese population is Japan-China relations. China is a vital economic partner, but neighbourly ties have been far from friendly, with disputes over issues such as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, historical resentment regarding Japan’s war crimes, just to name a few. Recently, tension has also been growing in the Taiwan Strait amid a growing Chinese military presence in the East and South China Seas and declining confidence in the reliability of the US security umbrella [4].

The election of Prime Minister Takaichi has escalated this situation. Her stance on expanding Japan’s self-defence forces, amending Article 9 of the constitution, and being a regular visitor to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, which honours Japan’s war dead, including ‘Class A’ war criminals, are among the reasons for China’s strong response [4] [13].

A major escalation occurred on the 7th of November, when Takaichi suggested that Japan’s self-defence forces could become militarily involved if China attacked Taiwan. This statement was seen as an interference in China’s internal affairs, prompting a range of diplomatic and economic retaliatory moves including import restrictions, heightened tensions along borders and at sea, and a military drill (“Justice Mission 2025”) [2] [3]. A Chinese diplomat also made comments that could be interpreted as a threat to behead Takaichi [2]. Takaichi has resisted pressure from Beijing to retract her remarks, emphasising that the position of the Japanese government has not changed from the 1972 Japan-China joint communique, which states that Japan respects China’s view on Taiwan but does not explicitly agree to the “One China” principle [5]. Beijing has since advised people not to travel to Japan, inflicting a massive blow on the tourism industry, which benefits millions from Chinese tourists every year [2].

Takaichi’s recent approach regarding Taiwan is vastly different from that of previous governments, which traditionally did not discuss sensitive scenarios publicly and, when asked about the issue, responded with ambiguous language [4]. If Takaichi were to continue her approach and deepen ties with Taiwan, this could further escalate an already dangerous relationship.

Overall, Sanae Takaichi’s election marks a symbolic breakthrough in Japan’s male-dominated political system, but her conservative stance and fragile coalition could limit the scope for meaningful domestic change. With a 75% support rate in Nikkei’s December public opinion poll [6], one has yet to see how she will take on stabilising her government while addressing Japan’s population crisis, tackling the stubborn stagnation, and managing regional tensions.

Works Cited

[1] Crabtree, C. and Golder, S. N. (2025). Takaichi’s Japan enters an era of fragile coalitions. East Asia Forum. East Asia Forum. Available at: https://eastasiaforum.org/2025/11/27/takaichis-japan-enters-an-era-of-fragile-coalitions/ (Accessed: 31 December 2025).

[2] Ewe, K. (2025a). ‘China and Japan in escalating spat over Taiwan: What to know’. BBC, 18 November. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crklvx2n7rzo (Accessed: 1 January 2026).

[3] Ewe, K. (2025b). ‘China holds military drills around Taiwan as warning to “separatist forces”’. BBC, 29 December. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c87l7xjp235o (Accessed: 29 December 2025).

[4] Hill, W. A. (2025). ‘Why China Is Worried About Sanae Takaichi, Japan’s New Prime Minister’. Forbes, 21 October. Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/wesleyhill/2025/10/21/why-china-is-worried-about-sanae-takaichi-japans-new-prime-minister/?utm_source=chatgpt.com (Accessed: 28 December 2025).

[5] Mayger, J. (2025). Why Taiwan Is At the Center of the China-Japan Spat. Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-12-05/china-japan-relations-why-sanae-takaichi-s-taiwan-comments-outraged-beijing?utm_source=chatgpt.com (Accessed: 29 December 2025).

[6] Nikkei Inc. (2025a). 高市内閣、70%台の支持率10〜12月維持　小泉・安倍政権と似る - 日本経済新聞. 日本経済新聞. 日本経済新聞. Available at: https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUA2137I0R21C25A2000000/ (Accessed: 26 December 2025).

[7] Nikkei Inc. (2025b). 高市首相、自維が衆院過半数で政権安定へ前進　参院なお過半数割れ - 日本経済新聞. 日本経済新聞. 日本経済新聞. Available at: https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUA277XY0X21C25A1000000/ (Accessed: 1 January 2026).

[8] Nikkei Inc. (2025c). 自民党・日本維新の会、「閣外連立」のリスク露呈　維新入閣固辞に高市首相「ありえへん」 - 日本経済新聞. 日本経済新聞. 日本経済新聞. Available at: https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUA154GD0V11C25A2000000/ (Accessed: 27 December 2025).

[9] Sankei Shimbun. (2025). 高市内閣、18~29歳の支持率92％　若者世代で圧倒人気…全世代65%超　政策も好感. The Sankei Shimbun. The Sankei Shimbun. Available at: https://www.sankei.com/article/20251222-ZGW7D2M7ZRLZ3O3CGOCP3N4J4U/ (Accessed: 3 January 2026).

[10] Takaichi, S. (2025). ‘Policy Speech by Prime Minister TAKAICHI Sanae to the 219th Session of the Diet’. 219th Session of the Diet, Diet of Japan, 24 October. Available at: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/104/statement/202510/24shoshinhyomei.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com#10 (Accessed: 1 January 2026).

[11] World Economic Forum. (2025). Global Gender Gap Report 2025. World Economic Forum. World Economic Forum. Available at: https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-gender-gap-report-2025/ (Accessed: 31 December 2025).

[12] Yamazaki, A. (2025). Japan’s first female PM breaks the glass ceiling, but many women remain skeptical - The Mainichi. The Mainichi. The Mainichi. Available at: https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20251027/p2a/00m/0na/011000c (Accessed: 31 December 2025).

[13] Yeung, T. (2025). ‘Meet Japan’s drum-playing, Thatcher-loving first female prime minister’. BBC News, 21 October. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crkj5e73xkmo (Accessed: 30 December 2025).