“Never Again”, Yet Again: The Failure of International Diplomacy in the Rwandan Genocide

Lou Cardot is a third-year student at the University of Toronto, pursuing a double major in Law and Political Science, with a minor in European Affairs. She came to UCL on exchange this year. Raised in Paris and Washington, D.C., Lou’s interests include human rights, gender equality, and immigration policy. This summer, she interned for Deloitte in Compliance. She also writes as a freelancer for the French Ministry of Defense and various law reviews across Europe and North America. (lou@cardot.me | LinkedIn)

Introduction: Rwanda’s Ethnic Fracture and the Road to 1994

For decades, Rwanda simmered with ethnic tensions engineered by colonial powers and amplified by post-independence politics. [1] Belgium, taking over from Germany after World War I, formalized divisions between the Hutu majority (about 85% of the population) and the Tutsi minority (15%) through identity cards and preferential treatment for Tutsis in administration and education. [2] This flipped in the 1950s as Belgium shifted support to Hutus amid independence pushes, sparking the 1959 "social revolution" that killed thousands of Tutsis and drove over 300,000 into exile in Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania. [3] Independence in 1962 brought Hutu rule under President Gregoire Kayibanda, followed by Juvenal Habyarimana's 1973 coup, which institutionalized discrimination through quotas limiting Tutsis in schools, jobs, and the military. [4]

By the late 1980s, economic woes (price crashes, overpopulation, land scarcity, etc) fueled unrest, with Habyarimana's regime scapegoating Tutsis. [5] In October 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a Tutsi-led rebel group from Ugandan exile, invaded northern Rwanda, demanding refugee returns and power-sharing. [6] This ignited a civil war, displacing a million people, with periodic massacres of Tutsis (e.g., 300 killed in Bugesera in 1992). [7] International involvement grew: France armed and trained Habyarimana’s forces as a francophone bulwark [8], while Belgium withdrew military aid due to human rights concerns but remained diplomatically engaged. [9] The Organization of African Unity (OAU) brokered fragile ceasefires, such as N’Sele in 1991. [10]

Peace talks in Arusha, Tanzania, from 1992-1993, facilitated by the OAU and involving the US, France, and UN observers, culminated in the August 1993 Accords, which promised a transitional government, refugee repatriation, and the integration of the army (60% government, 40% RPF). [11] Hardline extremists, excluded from negotiations, undermined the process through hate propaganda on RTLM radio, militia armament, and continued weapons imports despite embargoes. [12] The UN's Ndiaye report in 1993 flagged massacres as potential genocide under the 1948 Convention, but it gathered dust. [13] By early 1994, Rwanda teetered: the transitional government stalled, assassinations spiked, and militias trained openly. [14]

The Build-Up: Diplomatic Stumbles and Covered Warnings

International efforts crumbled under weak mandates and ignored intelligence. [15] The UN Security Council launched UNAMIR in October 1993 with 2,548 troops to oversee the Accords. [16] Still, it was a limited operation: no armored vehicles, no intelligence unit, and delayed arrivals (the Force Commander, Romeo Dallaire, arrived in late October). [17] U.S.-driven funding cuts, haunted by Somalia, left it under-resourced. [18] Dallaire's January 11, 1994, cable detailed an informant's tip on Interahamwe plans to kill Belgians (provoking withdrawal), exterminate Tutsis (1,000 every 20 minutes), and arms caches; he begged for raid authority. [14] The UN headquarters rejected it, citing the limits of Chapter VI peacekeeping and the prohibition on enforcement. [19] The cable wasn't even shared with the full Security Council and ended up lost in bureaucracy. [20]

More warnings piled up: Dallaire's February cables flagged militia arms distribution, grenade attacks, and "apocalypse" threats if Accords proceeded. [21] Belgian intelligence echoed genocide risks, and NGOs like Human Rights Watch reported ethnic targeting. [22] Yet donors like Canada phased out aid, citing abuses, while France continuously supplied weapons to the regime, breaching embargoes. [23] The OAU's Neutral Military Observer Group was toothless, bogged down in neutrality debates. [24] Aid conditionality, tying funds to human rights, fizzled; the World Bank and IMF delayed demobilization cash (US$136 million needed) over stalled transitions, creating a vicious cycle. [25]

Extremists exploited this: by March 1994, RTLM broadcast kill lists, and militias stockpiled machetes imported from China. [26] The international community misframed it all as civil war flare-ups, not orchestrated extermination prep. [27] As the UN Independent Inquiry later put it, this was a "failure of the UN system as a whole," with no contingency for peace collapse. [28]

The Genocide Unfolds: The World Looked Away

On April 6, 1994, Habyarimana's plane was downed over Kigali, blamed on extremists or RPF, unleashing hell. [29] Within hours, roadblocks sprang up, targeted killings began: moderate Hutus like Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana were murdered despite UN guards; Tutsi lists were executed door-to-door. [30] Over 100 days, an estimated 800,000–1 million people (primarily ethnic Tutsis, though recent scholarship estimates 500,000–800,000 total deaths), mostly by machete in churches, schools, and homes. [31] UNAMIR watched as 10 Belgian peacekeepers were killed in 24h, prompting Belgium's withdrawal and pleas forUNAMIR'sR shutdown. [32] By April 21, the Security Council slashed UNAMIR to 270 troops, shifting to "mediation" amid an estimated 100,000–200,000 dead already. [33]

Evacuations prioritized foreigners: France's Operation Amaryllis flew out 1,500 expatriates and regime allies, allegedly delivering ammo en route; Belgium and Italy followed suit, abandoning Rwandan staff. [34] Dallaire requested 5,000 reinforcements to protect civilians, which, according to later analyses, was feasible, but he received radio silence. [35] The US, scarred by Somalia's Black Hawk Down, buried intel on "final solution" plans and debated "genocide" wording for weeks to dodge Convention duties, finally opting for "acts of genocide." [36] France launched Operation Turquoise in June with 3,000 troops to create a ‘safe zone,’ but the operation later faced severe criticism for shielding fleeing genocidaires and facilitating their escape to Zaire. [37]

Aftermath: Refugee Crises and the Seeds of Regional Turmoil

The genocide's end in July 1994, when the RPF seized Kigali and halted the killings, did not mark a clean break and unleashed new diplomatic failures that exacerbated regional instability. [38] Over 2 million Hutus fled to neighboring countries, primarily Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) and Tanzania, fearing reprisals. [39] Refugee camps rapidly became militarized bases for Interahamwe and ex-government forces, [40] sustained by $1.4 billion in 1994 international aid that failed to separate combatants from civilians. [41]

France's Operation Turquoise, ostensibly a humanitarian intervention, drew sharp criticism for shielding fleeing genocidaires rather than protecting victims. [42] Launched under a UN mandate in late June 1994, it created a "safe humanitarian zone" in southwestern Rwanda. [43] Still, reports indicate it facilitated the escape of high-level perpetrators to Zaire, complete with weapons and vehicles. [44] Critics, including Rwandan officials and human rights groups, accused France of prioritizing its geopolitical interests, preserving francophone influence in Africa, over justice, allowing figures like Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, a key genocide architect, to evade capture initially. [45] The UN's delayed expansion of UNAMIR II to 5,500 troops in May 1994 came too late to stem the exodus or demilitarize camps, [46] as it was hampered by U.S. reluctance to fund the mission (covering 31% of costs) and by troop contributions from hesitant nations. [47] This post-genocide mishandling underscores how diplomatic inertia prolonged suffering, turning a national tragedy into a regional catastrophe. [48]

Analyzing the Failures: Institutional, Political, and Moral Lapses

The international community's collapse in Rwanda arose from institutional weaknesses, political self-interest, and moral abdication. [49] The UN's Independent Inquiry (1999), bluntly concluded that the organization "failed the people of Rwanda" through a "systemic failure" marked by inadequate resources, ignored warnings, and bureaucratic paralysis. [50] Force Commander Roméo Dallaire's infamous "genocide fax" (1994) detailed informant revelations about arms caches, plans to kill Belgian peacekeepers, and the capacity to exterminate 1,000 Tutsis every 20 minutes, yet UN headquarters in New York rejected his request for proactive raids, citing the mission's Chapter VI mandate that prohibited enforcement actions. [51] This cable was not even fully shared with the Security Council, lost in layers of red tape, exemplifying how rigid peacekeeping doctrines prioritized neutrality over prevention. [52]

Politically, major powers pursued narrow agendas. France, a staunch ally of the Habyarimana regime, supplied arms and training even after the genocide began, breaching UN embargoes, and framed the conflict as a civil war rather than ethnic extermination to justify its support. [53] A 2021 French commission report admitted "overwhelming responsibilities" for enabling the genocide through blind allegiance to the regime, though it stopped short of labeling it complicity. [54] The United States, reeling from the 1993 Somalia debacle where 18 American soldiers died, adopted a policy of deliberate inaction. Declassified documents reveal the Clinton administration buried intelligence on mass killings and avoided the term "genocide" for weeks to evade obligations under the 1948 Genocide Convention, which mandates intervention. [55] Instead, officials quibbled over semantics, referring to "acts of genocide" while instructing spokespeople to downplay the scale, justifying non-intervention. [56] Belgium, after losing 10 peacekeepers, withdrew its contingent, pressuring the UN to reduce UNAMIR, further crippling the mission. [57]

The Legacy of Inaction and Partial Reforms: Lessons Learned?

In the genocide's wake, the international community vowed "never again," yet the lessons from Rwanda have been unevenly applied, revealing persistent diplomatic shortcomings. [58] The UN established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994 to prosecute key perpetrators, delivering justice for individuals such as Bagosora. [59] Still, it operated slowly and at significant cost (just under $2 billion by 2015), highlighting inefficiencies in global accountability mechanisms. [60] The 2000 Brahimi Report reformed UN peacekeeping, advocating robust Chapter VII mandates for civilian protection, thereby leading to stronger missions in places such as Sierra Leone. [61] The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, endorsed at the 2005 UN World Summit, emerged directly from Rwanda's failures, obligating states to prevent genocide and authorizing intervention when governments fail. [62]

However, these reforms failed to prevent a repeat of past failures. In the current civil war in the Darfur region (2003–present), the UN hesitated on the "genocide" label [63], echoing U.S. semantics in Rwanda, resulting in delayed action and hundreds of thousands dead. Syria's civil war (2011–ongoing) saw vetoes by Russia and China block interventions, underscoring Security Council paralysis, a flaw unaddressed since 1994. [64] Amnesty International's 2014 assessment lamented that the world "collectively failed to act on the lessons of the Rwandan genocide," with ongoing crises in the Central African Republic and Myanmar revealing selective application of R2P based on geopolitical interests. [65]

Rwanda itself has rebuilt remarkably, achieving economic growth and stability under President Paul Kagame [66], but at the cost of authoritarianism, raising questions about whether international neglect forced self-reliance or perpetuated cycles of repression. [67]

Works Cited

[1] Prunier, G. (1997) The Rwanda crisis: history of a genocide. London: Hurst & Company, pp. 23–40.

[2] Des Forges, A. (1999) Leave none to tell the story: genocide in Rwanda. New York: Human Rights Watch, pp. 31–40; Gourevitch, P. (1998) We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: stories from Rwanda. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, pp. 47–54.

[3] Prunier (1997), pp. 61–62; United Nations (n.d.) Outreach Programme on the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda and the United Nations: historical background.

[4] Mamdani, M. (2001) When victims become killers: colonialism, nativism, and the genocide in Rwanda. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 132–138; Des Forges (1999), pp. 41–45.

[5] Prunier, G. (1997) The Rwanda crisis: history of a genocide. London: Hurst & Company, pp. 75–87; Uvin, P. (1998) Aiding violence: the development enterprise in Rwanda. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, pp. 43–56.

[6] Prunier (1997), pp. 93–113; United Nations (n.d.) Outreach Programme on the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda and the United Nations: historical background. [7] Des Forges, A. (1999) Leave none to tell the story: genocide in Rwanda. New York: Human Rights Watch, pp. 87–92.

[8] Prunier (1997), pp. 100–102; Melvern, L. (2000) A people betrayed: the role of the West in Rwanda's genocide. London: Zed Books, pp. 56–62.

[9] Des Forges (1999), pp. 78–80; Prunier (1997), pp. 102–103.

[10] Prunier (1997), pp. 114–115; United Nations Peace Agreements Database (1993) Arusha Peace Agreement (referencing N'Sele Ceasefire). Available at: relevant UN archives.

[11] Prunier, G. (1997) The Rwanda crisis: history of a genocide. London: Hurst & Company, pp. 159–192; Jones, B. D. (2001) Peacemaking in Rwanda: the dynamics of failure. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 87–112.

[12] Des Forges, A. (1999) Leave none to tell the story: genocide in Rwanda. New York: Human Rights Watch, pp. 106–124; Melvern, L. (2006) Conspiracy to murder: the Rwandan genocide. London: Verso, pp. 78–89.

[13] United Nations Economic and Social Council (1993) Report by Mr. B.W. Ndiaye, Special Rapporteur, on his mission to Rwanda from 8 to 17 April 1993 (E/CN.4/1994/7/Add.1), 11 August 1993; Des Forges (1999), pp. 135–137.

[14] Dallaire, R. (2003) Shake hands with the devil: the failure of humanity in Rwanda. Toronto: Random House Canada, pp. 142–168; Prunier (1997), pp. 199–212.

[15] United Nations (1999) Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. New York: United Nations, pp. 12–25; Dallaire, R. (2003) Shake hands with the devil: the failure of humanity in Rwanda. Toronto: Random House Canada, pp. 190–230.

[16] United Nations Security Council Resolution 872 (1993), 5 October 1993; Prunier, G. (1997) The Rwanda crisis: history of a genocide. London: Hurst & Company, pp. 193–198.

[17] Dallaire (2003), pp. 78–95; Des Forges, A. (1999) Leave none to tell the story: genocide in Rwanda. New York: Human Rights Watch, pp. 142–150.

[18] Melvern, L. (2000) A people betrayed: the role of the West in Rwanda's genocide. London: Zed Books, pp. 102–110; Power, S. (2002) "A problem from hell": America and the age of genocide. New York: Basic Books, pp. 329–340.

[19] Dallaire (2003), pp. 141–146; United Nations Holocaust Memorial Museum (n.d.) The "Genocide Fax" (facsimile of 11 January 1994 cable). Available at: relevant archives. [20] United Nations (1999), pp. 20–22; Keating, C. (2014) Statement to UN Security Council commemoration, 16 April 2014.

[21] Dallaire, R. (2003) Shake hands with the devil: the failure of humanity in Rwanda. Toronto: Random House Canada, pp. 162–175; United Nations (1999) Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. New York: United Nations, pp. 23–26.

[22] Human Rights Watch (1994) Arming Rwanda: arms trade and human rights abuses in the Rwandan war. New York: Human Rights Watch, January 1994; Des Forges, A. (1999) Leave none to tell the story: genocide in Rwanda. New York: Human Rights Watch, pp. 150–160.

[23] Melvern, L. (2000) A people betrayed: the role of the West in Rwanda's genocide. London: Zed Books, pp. 111–120; Power, S. (2002) "A problem from hell": America and the age of genocide. New York: Basic Books, pp. 341–350.

[24] Prunier, G. (1997) The Rwanda crisis: history of a genocide. London: Hurst & Company, pp. 213–220; Jones, B. D. (2001) Peacemaking in Rwanda: the dynamics of failure. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 113–125.

[25] Uvin, P. (1998) Aiding violence: the development enterprise in Rwanda. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, pp. 57–70; World Bank (1994) Rwanda: emergency demobilization and reintegration program (internal report, declassified excerpts).

[26] Thompson, A. (2007) The media and the Rwanda genocide. London: Pluto Press, pp. 89–102; Des Forges (1999), pp. 161–170.

[27] United Nations (1999), pp. 27–35; Melvern (2000), pp. 121–130.

[28] United Nations (1999), p. 3 (executive summary); Dallaire (2003), pp. 176–190.

[29] Prunier, G. (1997) The Rwanda crisis: history of a genocide. London: Hurst & Company, pp. 213–230; Melvern, L. (2006) Conspiracy to murder: the Rwandan genocide. London: Verso, pp. 191–210.

[30] Des Forges, A. (1999) Leave none to tell the story: genocide in Rwanda. New York: Human Rights Watch, pp. 171–200; Dallaire, R. (2003) Shake hands with the devil: the failure of humanity in Rwanda. Toronto: Random House Canada, pp. 231–250.

[31] Straus, S. (2006) The order of genocide: race, power, and war in Rwanda. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 41–50 (on revised death estimates); United Nations (1999) Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. New York: United Nations.

[32] Dallaire (2003), pp. 251–270; United Nations (1999), pp. 28–32.

[33] United Nations Security Council Resolution 912 (1994), 21 April 1994; Des Forges (1999), pp. 201–220.

[34] Prunier (1997), pp. 231–240; Melvern, L. (2000) A people betrayed: the role of the West in Rwanda's genocide. London: Zed Books, pp. 145–160.

[35] Dallaire (2003), pp. 291–320; United Nations (1999), pp. 33–40 (on feasibility of reinforcement).

[36] Power, S. (2002) "A problem from hell": America and the age of genocide. New York: Basic Books, pp. 329–389; declassified U.S. State Department documents (1994).

[37] Prunier (1997), pp. 281–300; French Parliamentary Inquiry (1998) Rapport d'information sur les opérations militaires menées par la France au Rwanda (Mission Quilès).

[38] Prunier, G. (1997) The Rwanda crisis: history of a genocide. London: Hurst & Company, pp. 312–330; Terry, F. (2002) Condemned to repeat? The paradox of humanitarian action. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 155–215.

[39] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (1996) The state of the world's refugees: fifty years of humanitarian action. Oxford: Oxford University Press (chapter on Great Lakes crisis); Lischer, S. K. (2005) Dangerous sanctuary: refugee camps, civil war, and the dilemmas of humanitarian aid. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 73–95.

[40] Prunier (1997), pp. 331–350; Human Rights Watch (1999) Leave none to tell the story: genocide in Rwanda (updated edition), pp. 721–750.

[41] Terry (2002), pp. 168–180 (on aid diversion and militarization); Millwood, D. (ed.) (1996) The international response to conflict and genocide: lessons from the Rwanda experience. Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (Synthesis Report notes over $1 million per day at peak in late 1994).

[42] Prunier, G. (1997) The Rwanda crisis: history of a genocide. London: Hurst & Company, pp. 281–300; Human Rights Watch (1999) Leave none to tell the story: genocide in Rwanda (updated sections on Turquoise).

[43] United Nations Security Council Resolution 929 (1994), 22 June 1994; French Parliamentary Inquiry (1998) Rapport d'information sur les opérations militaires menées par la France, autres pays et l'ONU au Rwanda (Mission Quilès).

[44] Prunier (1997), pp. 292–298; Des Forges, A. (1999) Leave none to tell the story: genocide in Rwanda. New York: Human Rights Watch, pp. 681–700.

[45] Kroslak, D. (2007) The role of France in the Rwandan genocide. London: Hurst & Company, pp. 245–280; Rwanda Government (2006) Report of the Mucyo Commission on France's role in the 1994 genocide.

[46] United Nations Security Council Resolution 918 (1994), 17 May 1994; United Nations (1999) Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. New York: United Nations, pp. 41–45.

[47] Melvern, L. (2000) A people betrayed: the role of the West in Rwanda's genocide. London: Zed Books, pp. 210–230; Power, S. (2002) "A problem from hell": America and the age of genocide. New York: Basic Books, pp. 370–380.

[48] Terry, F. (2002) Condemned to repeat? The paradox of humanitarian action. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 215–220; Millwood, D. (ed.) (1996) The international response to conflict and genocide: lessons from the Rwanda experience (Synthesis Report).

[49] United Nations (1999) Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. New York: United Nations, pp. 45–50.

[50] United Nations (1999), p. 3 (executive summary quote slightly adapted for precision).

[51] Dallaire, R. (2003) Shake hands with the devil: the failure of humanity in Rwanda. Toronto: Random House Canada, pp. 141–146; United Nations (1999), pp. 20–22.

[52] United Nations (1999), pp. 23–27; Barnett, M. (2002) Eyewitness to a genocide: the United Nations and Rwanda. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 95–120.

[53] Kroslak, D. (2007) The role of France in the Rwandan genocide. London: Hurst & Company, pp. 210–240; Melvern, L. (2006) Conspiracy to murder: the Rwandan genocide. London: Verso, pp. 150–180.

[54] Duclert Commission (2021) Rapport de la Commission de recherche sur les archives françaises relatives au Rwanda et au génocide des Tutsi (Commission Duclert). Paris: Ministère des Armées.

[55] Power, S. (2002) "A problem from hell": America and the age of genocide. New York: Basic Books, pp. 329–389.

[56] Power (2002), pp. 358–370; declassified U.S. Department of State memoranda (1994), released under Freedom of Information Act.

[57] Dallaire (2003), pp. 251–270; United Nations (1999), pp. 28–32.

[58] United Nations (1999) Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. New York: United Nations, pp. 51–55; Evans, G. (2008) The responsibility to protect: ending mass atrocity crimes once and for all. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 31–55.

[59] United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), 8 November 1994; International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (2015) Legacy website and final report.

[60] Cruvellier, T. (2010) Court of remorse: inside the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press; ICTR (2015) Completion Strategy Report (total budget figures).

[61] United Nations (2000) Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report, A/55/305–S/2000/809); Durch, W. J. et al. (2003) The Brahimi Report and the future of UN peace operations. Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center.

[62] United Nations General Assembly (2005) World Summit Outcome Document (A/RES/60/1), paras. 138–139; Bellamy, A. J. (2009) Responsibility to protect: the global effort to end mass atrocities. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 66–90.

[63] Power, S. (2002) "A problem from hell": America and the age of genocide. New York: Basic Books (comparative chapter); Totten, S. (ed.) (2012) Genocide in Darfur: impediments to international intervention. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

[64] Bellamy (2009), pp. 145–170; Gifkins, J. (2016) 'R2P in the UN Security Council: Darfur, Libya and beyond', Cooperation and Conflict, 51(4), pp. 446–464.

[65] Amnesty International (2014) Twenty years after Rwanda: lessons learned and unlearned on genocide prevention; Hehir, A. (2013) 'The permanence of inconsistency: Libya, the Security Council, and the Responsibility to Protect', International Security, 38(1), pp. 137–159.

[66] Reyntjens, F. (2013) Political governance in post-genocide Rwanda. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; World Bank (2023) Rwanda Economic Update (growth statistics).

[67] Straus, S. and Waldorf, L. (eds.) (2011) Remaking Rwanda: state building and human rights after mass violence. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 3–30.