Does Closing the Door Make Europe Safer?
- Anna-Margarita Balayan
- 4 days ago
- 6 min read
Updated: 1 day ago
Anna-Margarita Balayan is a first-year History, Politics and Economics student. With a specific interest in Eurasian affairs, she researched the social and strategic implications of the European Union’s most recent measures to curb Russian espionage and hostile influence through changes to Schengen visa policy. (https://www.linkedin.com/in/anna-margarita-balayan-/)
Introduction
On 6 November 2025, the European Union announced the suspension of multiple-entry Schengen tourist visas for Russian nationals, presenting the decision as a security measure countering espionage and hostile influence. EU officials framed the move as a response to Russia’s use of civilian mobility for intelligence collection, logistics, and network maintenance across Europe. In an era shaped by hybrid warfare and information operations, the logic appears intuitive: limit repeated access, reduce risk. Yet the relationship between mobility, security, and political control is rarely linear.
One of the most consequential gambles in an individual’s life is the passport they are born with. It is a structural lottery decided at birth, yet it governs access to movement, speech, and opportunity. To be born in Europe remains statistically rare, roughly a four to five per cent probability, and that accident alone often determines whether one can cross borders freely or remain constrained within an authoritarian system. Visa policy therefore does not merely regulate travel; it redistributes access to safety, networks and political exit.
Russia’s modern political history is inseparable from emigration. Periods of repression -from the intellectual flight following the 1917 Revolution, through Stalinist repression and the Cold War, to the present Putin era- have repeatedly coincided with outward movement by intellectuals, professionals, and dissidents, many of whom operated abroad precisely because access to foreign states remained open. Russian political and cultural life has long developed in parallel with displacement.
Since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, this pattern has reasserted itself. Hundreds of thousands of Russians -many educated, professionally mobile, and politically opposed to the war- have left the country. The question raised by the EU’s visa decision is therefore not whether it is morally fair, but whether it is strategically effective. Does banning multi-entry tourist visas for Russian passport-holders meaningfully disrupt Kremlin intelligence and influence operations, or does it primarily harden the penalties of birthplace while leaving professional and covert networks largely untouched?
There is also a strategic paradox. The Kremlin’s domestic legitimacy relies heavily on narratives of isolation, encirclement, and permanent hostility from the West. Policies that further restrict contact between Russian society and Europe risk reinforcing precisely the worldview the regime promotes, while narrowing the space for alternative political identities to develop beyond Russia’s borders.
There are no easy answers. But if visa bans deliver reassurance more than security, their long-term costs may exceed their immediate appeal.
Definitions and policy context
While espionage has historically been more clearly defined as the acquisition of sensitive information on behalf of a foreign state, the concept of hostile influence is inherently more complex. It encompasses subversive activities that fall short of classical espionage but aim to shape public opinion, influence policy, or alter social dynamics in favour of a foreign power. In the modern media environment, particularly with the expansion of digital platforms and online communication, such activities have become significantly easier to conduct and harder to trace.
Russian efforts to cultivate pro Kremlin networks, promote favourable narratives, and interfere in domestic political processes have been documented throughout Vladimir Putin’s time in power. The most widely cited example remains the confirmed interference in the 2016 United States presidential election, which involved coordinated disinformation campaigns and the use of fabricated social media accounts to manipulate public discourse. In an era where traditional forms of sabotage and espionage are increasingly supplemented, and in some cases replaced, by online operations, it is reasonable to question whether outward facing measures such as visa restrictions can meaningfully address these evolving threats.
Arrests
Available data on individuals arrested in the Schengen zone for Russian linked espionage, sabotage, or hostile influence activities since February 2022 suggests that only around thirty one percent were Russian nationals. Poland provides a particularly illustrative example, as it has reported the highest number of such arrests. In 2023, Polish authorities dismantled a spy ring consisting of sixteen operatives, of whom twelve were Ukrainian nationals, three were Belarusian, and only one was Russian. The group conducted acts of sabotage on behalf of Russia and operated through encrypted communication channels to receive instructions, document completed tasks, and obtain payment through cryptocurrencies, as reported by Poland’s Internal Security Agency.
This pattern is reinforced by developments in Germany, where all three published separate cases of Russian espionage involved individuals who were not Russian nationals. These cases concerned a German intelligence officer, an accomplice, and a Bundeswehr (armed forces of Germany) procurement officer who supplied information to Russian military intelligence handlers. Similar trends appear elsewhere. In Latvia, out of eight individuals arrested for Russian linked activities, the majority were Latvian citizens, with only one Russian national reported. In Lithuania, a sabotage network responsible for mailing incendiary devices to European Union states on behalf of Russian intelligence is believed to have consisted primarily of local operatives.
Taken together, this evidence points towards a consistent reliance on deep cover operatives, third country nationals, and local insiders rather than Russian tourists or short-term visitors. These structures form the backbone of Russian espionage and hostile influence activity within the Schengen area.
Diaspora linked influence structures
At the same time, the role of Russian diaspora linked institutions, and dual citizens should not be underestimated. A prominent example is the network of so-called Russian Houses, officially presented as cultural centres promoting Russian language and heritage. In practice, several have been linked to influence operations. A Russian House in Copenhagen was reportedly used by Russian intelligence officers for industrial espionage, while the Russisches Haus in Berlin has been widely described as a centre for disseminating Kremlin aligned narratives. Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, similar centres have screened state produced propaganda films justifying the invasion.
In response to these activities, the European Union sanctioned Rossotrudnichestvo (Russia’s state agency for cultural and humanitarian outreach abroad) in 2022, identifying it as an instrument of Kremlin influence. Following this decision, several countries including Slovenia, Slovakia, and Croatia closed Russian cultural centres. However, in other states such as France, Germany, and Italy, these institutions remain operational due to existing diplomatic agreements that complicate their closure.
Another significant example is Pravfond, a foundation established to support Russian compatriots abroad. Leaked correspondence in 2023 revealed that the organisation financed legal defence costs for convicted Russian agents and subsidised pro-Russian media outlets in the Baltic states. These cases illustrate that substantial sources of Russian hostile influence remain embedded within the Schengen zone and are often connected to long term institutional and diaspora-based networks rather than temporary visitors.
Strategic implications of visa restrictions
Institutions linked to the Russian diaspora, third country nationals recruited by Russian intelligence services, and local insiders account for most of the documented espionage and hostile influence activity. These channels are not meaningfully dependent on Russian tourist mobility. As a result, the suspension of multi entry tourist visas is unlikely to significantly disrupt the operational capacity of such networks.
It is understandable that, in a political climate where language and cultural affiliation are increasingly politicised, outward exclusion appears to offer a clear signal of opposition to the Russian state. However, the long-term strategic costs of this approach risk outweighing its symbolic appeal. As demonstrated above, the policy’s effectiveness in curbing espionage and hostile influence is likely to be limited.
At the same time, the measure risks reinforcing one of the Kremlin’s central narratives, namely that Russia is surrounded by hostile powers seeking to isolate and undermine it. Russian media, political institutions, and educational structures consistently promote an image of Europe as an adversary, framing the invasion of Ukraine as a pre-emptive response to Western encroachment. Many Russian citizens, including those critical of the government, internalise this narrative.
By further restricting access to Europe, the European Union risks intensifying feelings of alienation among Russian nationals, including those opposed to the war and the current regime. This isolation may paradoxically push some individuals towards greater dependence on the Russian state as the sole perceived source of security and belonging.
Conclusion
The isolation produced by these visa restrictions therefore carries a significant political cost. It deepens passport-based discrimination while reinforcing the Kremlin’s rhetoric of encirclement, all without delivering commensurate security benefits. The policy is thus more likely to provide political reassurance than tangible operational impact. In practice, it leaves professional espionage networks largely intact while inadvertently strengthening the domestic narrative promoted by the Putin regime.
Works Cited
Poland charges man with orchestrating sabotage for Russia Reuters
Published: 2 December 2025 https://www.reuters.com/world/poland-charges-man-with-orchestrating-sabotage-russia-2025-12-02/
GRU agent detained in Poland Government of Poland Published: undated https://www.gov.pl/web/special-services/gru-agent-detained-in-poland
Suspected spy for Russia arrested in Germany – prosecutors
Reuters Published: 9 August 2023 https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/suspected-spy-russia-arrested-germany-prosecutors-2023-08-09/
VDD detains a person on suspicion of espionage on behalf of Russian intelligence and security service State Security Service of Latvia Published: undated https://vdd.gov.lv/en/news/press-releases/vdd-detains-a-person-on-suspicion-of-espionage-on-behalf-of-russian-intelligence-and-security-service
UK, Lithuania and Latvia detain people over allegations of arson and spying for Russia Courthouse News Service Published: undated https://www.courthousenews.com/uk-lithuania-and-latvia-detain-people-over-allegations-of-arson-and-spying-for-russia/
EU imposes sanctions on state-owned outlets RT/Russia Today and Sputnik’s broadcasting in the EU Council of the European Union Published: 2 March 2022 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/02/eu-imposes-sanctions-on-state-owned-outlets-rtrussia-today-and-sputnik-s-broadcasting-in-the-eu/
The world is dismantling the network of Russian cultural centres Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine Published: undated https://www.szru.gov.ua/en/news-media/news/the-world-is-dismantling-the-network-of-russian-cultural-centres
AIVD disrupts activities of Russian intelligence officer targeting the International Criminal Court AIVD Published: 16 June 2022 https://english.aivd.nl/latest/news/2022/06/16/aivd-disrupts-activities-of-russian-intelligence-officer-targeting-the-international-criminal-court
Poland arrests nine over alleged plot to sabotage Ukraine arms supplies The Guardian Published: 16 March 2023 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/16/poland-arrests-nine-over-alleged-plot-to-sabotage-ukraine-arms-supplies
Cultural diplomacy or cover for espionage? Why Russian cultural centres remain open across the globe The Kyiv Independent Published: undated https://kyivindependent.com/cultural-diplomacy-or-cover-for-espionage-why-russian-cultural-centers-remain-open-across-the-globe/
Revealed: Russian legal defence foundation Pravfond operating across Europe The Guardian Published: 2 June 2024 https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jun/02/revealed-russian-legal-defence-foundation-pravfond-europe
Russian foundation aimed at helping compatriots abroad supports spies, criminals and propagandists VSquare Published: undated https://vsquare.org/russian-foundation-aimed-at-helping-compatriots-abroad-supports-spies-criminals-and-propagandists/
