HIRAK, EPISODE II: THE ARDUOUS FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY IN POST-BOUTEFLIKA ALGERIA.
On the 22nd of February, thousands of protesters gathered in the streets of Algiers to mark the two-year anniversary of the “Hirak” movement, a wave of pro- democracy demonstrations which shook Algeria almost continuously since February
2019, with the exception of most of the year 2020 when, like the rest of the world, Algerians were forced into lockdown because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
But how did this popular mobilization, the size of which Algeria had not seen for decades, emerge?
It all started when Former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika announced that he was going to run for a fifth term in the elections which were to be held in April 2019. This announcement outraged the Algerian population, and understandably so: Bouteflika – a man in his eighties, riddled with sickness to the extent of not being able to walk alone, and hence startlingly unfit to rule – had come to power in 1999 and held onto it ever since, his regime being one dominated by a corrupt elite within the military.
The prospect of a fifth mandate was simply the final straw for the Algerian people, who began descending into the streets in millions demanding that Bouteflika resigns; and he ultimately did on the 2nd of April, pressurized by his own army which understood that demonstrators would not go home unless satisfied.
04
PA ,5791 ,regnissiK yrneH htiw akilfetuoB zizaledbA
Algeria, so it seemed then, was on the path of a democratic recalibration. Bouteflika had been ousted, and the protesters had even managed to twice postpone the presidential elections, so as to give time to the opposition to present a credible candidate against whichever one the National Liberation Front (FLN) – the party dominating Algerian politics since the country’s independence from France in 1962 –, in agreement with the army, would favour.
The FLN’s candidate, Abdelmadjid Tebboune, was nevertheless the victor of the December 2019 elections, which many have claimed to be yet another charade of change organised by the ruling elite. Tebboune was, after all, a friend of General Gaid Salah, the army’s top chief (before he died a few days after the elections); but most strikingly Tebboune had also been part of Bouteflika’s successive governments before the latter’s resignation. Tebboune’s election was therefore a blatant demonstration of the élite’s stranglehold on power and of the difficulty for grass-root movements to shake up the status quo.
14
WHAT FUTURE FOR THE HIRAK?
Although today the Hirak is still alive, as the new series of protests since February have shown, it is struggling to regain the momentum it had two years ago.
The obvious reason for that is the pandemic; the sequence of lockdowns and the consequent wave of unemployment have shifted people’s attention away from a cause principally concerned with political freedoms rather than socioeconomic issues.
But more crucially, the Hirak is structurally weak, hence ill-equipped for a constructive, long-run struggle. It emerged spontaneously and lacks the ideological cement which holds together any robust political organisation; its initial goal, around which there was a widespread consensus, was the ousting of Bouteflika. Once Bouteflika had been deposed, the movement therefore had lost any substantive programmatic compass beyond the vague commitment to defend democracy. Today the leaderless Hirak, as an entity, appears unable to bring forth a precise set of grievances, and seems to be immobilised in a posture of contestation.
PA ,1202 ,srieglA ,stsetorP kariH ehT
What is more, the movement is beginning to divide itself along generational lines. In 2019 people of all ages were protesting with a common voice; this is not the case anymore: the composition of the rekindled Hirak has changed. Today the most zealous members of the movement are found amongst students, who categorically reject a political system which they view as a military dictatorship and as having no popular legitimacy whatsoever: they still relentlessly chant the slogan “A civil state, not a military one” which came to symbolise the Hirak since its inception.
Older people, however, are increasingly feeling uncomfortable with this incessant attack on the military. What had pushed them to join the movement in 2019 had mainly been the unpleasant prospect of being governed for another five years by a sick, incompetent elderly man rather than a rejection per se of the entire military cast. Indeed, many people who remember Algeria’s independence war against France from 1954 to 1962 struggle to bridge their democratic aspirations and their patriotism, as the army is still somewhat bathed in prestige for the role it played in delivering the country from its colonial subjugation: disavowing the army, as they see it, is tantamount to being unpatriotic. Therefore, the social cleavage tearing up Algerian society is slowly evolving from one of democrats against “un-democrats”, to a subtler one opposing past and future: “Building a state with young people, not with old ones”, read a placard waved by a protester last February. Such a radical regeneration, however, fails to involve everyone.
But the Hirak’s lack of a clear political programme and its heteroclite composition are not the only factors impeding its credible resurgence; truth be told, Tebboune’s government, despite its questionable legitimacy, has been somewhat forthcoming in meeting protesters’ demands for reform – or at the very least in feigning to meet them.
34
After his election, President Tebboune set to appease his country with a constitutional reform meant to rebuild people’s trust in their political system. And on paper the reform appears to be a real step forward: amongst other things it reintroduces a limit to the number of terms a president can serve (in 2008 Bouteflika had managed to suppress that limit) and includes pledges in favour of civic freedoms. Furthermore, it stipulates that the Prime Minister should be drawn from the parliamentary majority of the lower chamber rather than be appointed directly by the President, which theoretically makes the executive more accountable to the people.
Algerians were called to decide the fate of this constitutional reform in a referendum held on the 1st of November 2020 – a highly symbolic date commemorating the beginning of Algeria’s liberation struggle in 1954, therefore reinforcing the idea of the country being at the dawn of a new social contract and of a new, bright beginning. The reform was approved by 66% of voters, but with a voter turnout of only 23.7% – most Algerians, not blinded by historical symbolism, knowing that the governing élite cares little of legal frameworks. But the referendum results nevertheless advantaged the government by allowing it to display an active effort of reform.
segamI ytteG ,0691 ,aireglA ,noitcerrusnI
More recently last February, Tebboune seemed even more forthcoming as he announced the presidential pardon of dozens of political prisoners – Hirak militants – and the dissolution of the lower chamber, meaning that anticipated legislative elections should be held in the following five months instead of 2022. He also announced a re- shuffling of his government, with major ministries such as that of the economy, the industry, and tourism seeing a change of leadership, in what again seems like an attempt to showcase dynamism and reformative spirit, especially considering the recession linked to the pandemic.
Whether or not the all these seemingly positive changes are part of a grand scheme to stifle the Hirak by destroying its raison d’être is hard to tell; if it is, however, it is only successful insofar as recent demonstrations are smaller than they were in 2019. But one thing is certain: despite being fractured and having lost momentum, the Hirak and the pro-democratic message it carries is alive; only the future will tell us its fate.
FIN.