China and Taiwan: Navigating through a Diplomatic Deadlock

Introduction

The last 15 months of high intensity conflict in Ukraine provided valuable knowledge for both China and the United States, for a potential escalation over the sovereignty of Taiwan. On the one hand, a war in Europe prompted a more proactive stance from the EU and the USA, reinvigorating the position of those states. On the other hand, it showcased China that its strategy of avoiding direct confrontation proves to be once again an effective means of achieving its goals. The sanctions proof system of Russia has not only emphasised the limitations of such a position, but also the lengths at which its geopolitical rivals, in this case the European Union and the United States, are willing to go to inflict economic loss. Since China is completely intertwined with the international trade market, it would exponentially increase the consequences of full scale war. Therefore, it is unlikely that military escalation would occur in the near future.

The premise of a clash

The backbone of China’s strategy to dethrone US’ hegemonic stance consists of three elements. Firstly, it focused on depleting American influence within its region. Secondly, this scheme is followed by an aggressive economical posturing, aiming to establish China as the main player in its region. Finally, the strategy culminates with the foundation of as many international ties between China and various states as possible (Doshi, 2021). Whether through the famous Road and Belt initiative, as seen in various African states, or a peace broker position –  as is the posturing with Russia and Ukraine, Saudi Arabia and Iran respectively – China pivoted on shifting the current status quo in its favour, while preventing the need for military escalation (Joske, 2022). 

However, Taiwan represents an exception from the rule to Beijing’s foreign policy. In Taipei’s case, Xi Jinping explicitly highlighted the lengths at which the CCP of China would be willing to go to achieve reunification with the perceived rebellious province (Tian and Blanchard, 2022), citing military intervention to ‘pacify the rebellious region’ as an appropriate course of action. With the Democratic Progressive Party administration under Tsai Ing-wen, a staunch opposition to the ‘one country, two systems’ has been in place since 2016, with at least 2 official rejections of this rhetoric (Horton, 2019). Given the tense exchanges with Taiwan’s new president (ibid), it would seem that a lot of the progress in the last decades towards reintegrating Taiwan into mainland’s administration has been undone. 

With that being the case, many are left wondering what the future of this standoff will look like, and how this struggle could arrive at a finalisation.

President Tsai Ing-wen’s tough response to China this week has caused a groundswell of support for her in Taiwan.Credit...Ritchie B Tongo/EPA, via Shutterstock

Implications of conflict

Ever since the de facto ending of the Chinese Civil war and the beginning of the Strait Conflict, multiple bilateral efforts have been deployed to alleviate the situation of Two Chinas. Currently, the DPP administration of Ing-wen, who is in the 7th year of presidency, has grounded a robust position of independence from Beijing’s rule.

One of the primary points to consider is that the status established between the two states was volatile throughout the times. While there were bilateral strives to reach compromise, as was the case with the ‘three direct links‘, which symbolised travel, trade and postal means of contact (Dittmer, 2017), or the 1992 Consensus (Tiezzi, 2015), which aimed to find common ground on the ‘one country, two systems’ philosophy, the contact deteriorated since. The tense report became, in itself, the status quo. Xi understands that the situation cannot be optimally rebalanced at the moment, with a strong USA firmly behind Taiwan. Since this issue enjoys bipartisan support, it is unlikely DC-Taipei relations will degrade in the foreseeable future. It is thus sensible for China to further pursue a strategy which allows strengthening its international standing, as aforementioned in peace-brokering position or foreign investment (Bijian, 2005). However, as US general Mike Miniham of Air Mobility Command stated, he believes China’s window of opportunity is shrinking, and that ‘the ideal striking time is 2025’ (Kube and Gains, 2023), right after the US election which has, yet again, the potential to leave the nation divided. Depending on the strategy of calculating the cost of benefit in this dilemma, future Chinese foreign policy could maintain the current steadfast approach, or take up a more hostile posturing (Culver, 2022). 

Chinese President Xi Jinping opens the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.(Reuters: Thomas Peter)

Even if China supposedly considers the odds to be in its favour, once the die is cast and aggressive posturing is adopted, there is no turning back. Its reputation will take an exceptional hit, especially within the UN. Since China has not been engaged in a full-scale war since the 1979 conflict with Vietnam, it enjoys a rather unique position for a power of its calibre – one of not being perceived as a warmongering nation. The invasion of Taiwan would shatter the perception that many non-western aligned nations have, and perhaps increase the support for the United States in the region and beyond.

 Furthermore, the war in Ukraine provided a blueprint of how states in the vicinity of an active, full-scale conflagration would react. Unsurprisingly, the nations that reacted most hostile against Russia are those that enjoyed the previous international system in their vicinity, namely the US, EU countries and multiple partner states. It is realistic to expect a similar reaction in China’s aggression in its backyard. Nations like South Korea, Japan, Philippines or Vietnam are presumably going to have a negative reaction to the chauvinistic stance adopted by Beijing if the invasion is to commence. If not directly aiding the US in its struggle to defend Taiwan, countries in the SEC sea region will at the very least hinder China’s expansionist rhetoric. One of the most renowned means would be the Malacca Strait, shared by Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. A blockade of such a choke point will bottle-neck Chinese capabilities not just militarily, but also domestically, as 75% of China’s oil consumption is ensured by imports, 80% of which go through the Malacca Strait (Mudunuri, 2020). 

Finally, China would not be the only nation affected by such extreme measures. Since it is the biggest trading partner of many Asian nations, including economic giants like Japan or South Korea, the crippling financial implications of a Chinese crash will have vast and immediate ramifications across the continent, followed by a domino effect world-wide (Packard, 2022). This impending threat of monetary doom is just as dangerous to the statehood of nations involved as is the MAD doctrine, concerning nuclear warfare.

On path to collision?

When all factors are taken into consideration, is the result an amplification of the possibility of escalation, or a reduction of such a threat? Will the PRC back down, afraid of mutual annihilation, or will the CCP bank on this very threat to force the hand of Taiwan’s allies to concede defeat? The manner in which the lessons obtained from the war in Ukraine are employed will define the tackling of this diplomatic deadlock, as US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin emphasised, encouraging a pre-emptive, rather than reactionary position from the United States and its web of alliances. 

Specialists agree that Putin’s invasion of Ukraine had, to a significant degree, shaped Xi’s perception of a homologous operation in Taiwan. What is intriguing is that this change mainly translated into CCP recalculating the international order first, and the humanitarian or material cost of the invasion second. A leak from May 2022, provided by human rights activist Jennifer Zeng, showcases an alleged meeting of the top brass of the party discussing the personnel and equipment requirements in order to initiate an invasion of Taiwan. The figures mentioned only 140,000 personnel as being needed to achieve operational success (Suresh, 2022). 

Relative to the size of Taiwan, the supposed invasion force of the PLA would be comparable to Russia’s military corps unleashed on Ukraine on February 24 2022. Despite last year’s invasion providing most relevant empirical material to re-evaluate such an endeavour, it seems that the lessons attained from Russia’s end as the offensive party were not taken into consideration, in order to refine a potential replication on the other side of the world. This information further reiterates that militaristic action in settling the diplomatic remains confined to theoretical exercises within CCP’s inner circles, far from being established as a concise and realistic plan for an intervention.

A likely explanation is that those efforts play a role in exploring different ways to pressure the supporters of Taipei. 

An open conflict in the South East China Sea between Taiwan and China would entail a significantly higher risk to world peace than the on-going conflict in Ukraine does, which has provided the United States with valuable lessons in providing efficient assistance (France-Presse, 2023). Whilst the US opted in providing enormous financial, humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine, in Taipei’s case the United States are bound by a defensive type of treaty, which would entail full commitment from Washington in protecting the sovereignty of a state ever so carefully manoeuvres through a delicate balance of international law. The economic fallout of losing Taiwan, as well as the reputational loss from abandoning a valuable ally, is unaffordable for American foreign interests. Thus, the United States will throw all its weight against the hypothetical invasion of the PLA. 

Conclusion

Taking into consideration all of the risks, many are sceptical about a Chinese campaign to forcefully ‘pacify’ the last region of China. Even before the invasion of Ukraine, it is feasible that such an expedition was scraping the edges of realism in the drafts of the CCP leadership. Now, seeing the lengths at which rivals would be willing to go, even temporarily enduring hardships or handicapping themselves to inflict economic hits on their opponent, China is more reluctant in calling the bluff of the US and its Pacific Allies. 

The feasible course of action at this point is a tense status quo. Considering the soaring stakes implications of a direct confrontation, and with a strictly unilateral attempt to reunify China, it is likely that Taiwan’s issue will remain a focal point in domestic media coverage of PRC, while in reality becoming more of a backstage goal, rather than an achievement actively worked on to be accomplished. PRC will further devote funds to causes that produce tangible results: international commitments, in order to gradually replace American influence and erode its hegemonic supremacy, aiming to potentiate an ever increasing web of economical connections across the world. 

Though Taiwan remains at the ideological forefront of CCP’s agenda, being tied to the moulded identity of mainland China, it is unlikely that a drastic change of dynamic will take place in the current context. Therefore, Xi’s diplomatic game remains centred on improving China’s odds before a potential clash with its geopolitical main rival. It is to be seen if the reaction of the United States to China’s aggressive posturing - of employing a proactive stance with the nations in South-East Asia - will suffice, or whether it would curb Xi Jingping’s ambitions. If those efforts fall short, there is a potential to open a window of opportunity to seize a 74 year-long objective.