BATTLE OF THE TRUTH: THE NORTH MACEDONIAN-BULGARIAN CULTURAL LITIGATION, AND HOW IT IS MERELY A SYMPTOM OF A WIDER EUROPEAN PHENOMENON

In varietate concordia – “united in diversity” – is the European Union’s motto. It encapsulates in a nutshell, the Union’s founding tenets of peace, cooperation, and acceptance of cultural differences. But recently, diversity is what hindered further European enlargement. Last November, Bulgaria blocked the progression of North Macedonia on the road to EU membership. Why? Because of the way North Macedonian historiography has and continues to present the relationship between the two neighbouring countries’ historical and cultural legacies. But to understand the

origins of the current situation, taking a step back in the past is of the essence.

COMPLICATED BALKANS

Both the territories of nowadays Bulgaria and of North Macedonia were under the Ottoman rule for centuries. In the Balkans, the nation as a modern concept appeared in the late XVIIIth century and developed throughout the XIXth century. The idea of nation and national identity slowly imposed itself under the impulse of urban as well as rural intelligentsias, and revolutionary groups and armed struggles for national liberation began. In 1878, Bulgaria gained its autonomy, but not in the form that it had been promised in the San Stefano Treaty, leaving a territory which it considered ethnically Bulgarian and rightfully hers outside its boundaries: modern-day North Macedonia. So began the story of, on the Bulgarian side – and indeed for some people outside of Bulgaria’s frontiers –, a perceived unfair separation between ethnic “brothers”. Ultimately, there emerged a Macedonian national identity too, which increasingly emancipated itself from the Bulgarian one; the Macedonian language was standardised in the 1940s, and like any nation, North Macedonia built historical myths about its foundation. From the end of the XIXth century up until today, Bulgaria unwillingly had to face the fact that North Macedonia is a separate nation and to accept that its irredentist dreams are just that – dreams.

Today, the litigation between North Macedonia and Bulgaria is mainly centred around language. Bulgarians consider Macedonian as a dialect of Bulgarian which was artificially engineered into a national language and to break the current diplomatic deadlock, among other things Bulgaria even insists that in official documents the EU use the appellation “the official language of North Macedonia” instead of “Macedonian”.

On the question of language, Alexander Kiossev – Professor in History of Modern Culture at Sofia University – wrote: “Those who argue that the Macedonian language is a dialect of Bulgarian are not clear on the concepts they speak of; they know neither what a dialect is, nor what a language is. (...) They think of languages and the nation in obsolete terms, according to which these are not human constructs, but rather God-given.” 2 The reality is that all standard languages are, to some extent, engineered:English, French, or Bulgarian, are no exceptions.

The two countries also fight over the legacy of Gotse Delchev, a nineteenth-century revolutionary. North Macedonians consider Gotse Delchev their national hero, whose fight for the autonomy of their country during the second half of the XIXth century they see as a founding element of their national awakening; the Bulgarians, on the other hand, deny Gotse Delchev being a Macedonian hero altogether since he thought of himself as a Bulgarian. It seems that neither side is willing to accept that he can be a North Macedonian hero while having identified as Bulgarian; Charlemagne, for example, is (quite) incontestably a historical figure shared by both the Germans and the French.

“CULTURIZED” POLITICS

This irruption of a cultural conflict in the highest spheres of diplomatic relations and EU politics has somewhat denatured a debate which should be scholarly, not political; it has transformed it into an over-simplistic dichotomy in which one country is necessarily good and right, and the other evil and wrong, when in fact the truth is that on this issue neither is solely the one nor the other. “The Macedonians go too far with their attempts to differentiate themselves from Bulgarians, and the Bulgarians, with their blind denial of the Macedonian singularity.” 3, said Professor Raymond Detrez – a Belgian specialist of East European culture – in an interview.

But to the regret of many scholars – Bulgarian and Macedonian – the fact remains that the matter has become political. Many intellectuals have written open letters to the governments of both countries, calling them to accept pluralistic interpretations of history, which by definition is not a scientifically exact discipline, and to focus on the present, on building an excellent bilateral relationship, instead of ceaselessly dwelling on the past.

The Bulgarian government’s obstinacy on this cultural issue and its subsequent blocking of the negotiations on North Macedonia’s future EU membership can seem surprising as Bulgaria too would ripe economic benefits from its neighbour’s entry into the Union. The two countries are close trading partners, as in 2019, Bulgaria was North Macedonia’s 3rd most crucial exporting destination, while North Macedonia was in Bulgaria’s top 20 exporting destinations. If North Macedonia were to join the EU, the two neighbours would also benefit from substantial EU funds to build trans-border infrastructures, which would enhance trans-border trade, and therefore be mutually beneficial; economically, this cultural quarrel is a lose-lose situation.

What is more, all of this is just a delay: North Macedonia will sooner or later join the EU. And despite not directly taking sides, France and Germany want the historical dispute to be overcome; “reinforced cooperation is in the interest of all”, said France’s President Emmanuel Macron. A dragging on of the deadlock is only a recipe for sour relations in the future.

CULTURE IN THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL DISCOURSE

But Bulgaria is certainly not the EU’s “black sheep” with its nationalistic politicisation of culture; instead, it is merely one sheep in a growing herd. It would appear that we have entered an era in which cultural “national interests” are becoming increasingly salient in the European political landscape, notably – although certainly not exclusively – in Eastern Europe. For example, Hungary’s ruling party, FIDESZ, has continually opposed any form of EU pro-immigration policy, which FIDESZ understands as pro- Muslim immigration because it threatens the Hungarian national identity and culture, which they consider inseparable from Christianity. Similarly, Poland has recently virtually banned abortion because of its supposed incompatibility with Catholic principles, which are central – so Polish right-wing politicians claim – to the Polish identity. In Western Europe, populists brandishing national specificities as electoral slogans are gaining political ground too, and although their parties do not rule – at least not alone –, their impact on society is nevertheless significant; Marine Le Pen and Matteo Salvini, to only cite two of them, are extremely popular respectively in France and Italy. The former made it to the second round of the French Presidential elections of 2017 and as of now seems to be the only serious opponent of Emmanuel Macron, should he run for re-election in 2022, while the latter was Deputy Prime Minister in Giuseppe Conte’s coalition government until 2019, and still retains popularity amongst a significant portion of the Italian population. Even Germany which, under the leadership of Angela Merkel, often appears like the leading proponent of reasoned, rational, and stable politics within the bloc, has seen a rise in popularity of nationalism- populism, which raises legitimate questions about the country’s political direction, given Merkel’s approaching retirement after the 2021 autumn elections.

The reality is that,regardless of theirreasons, leaderssuch as Hungary’sViktor Orban,Poland’s AndrzejDuda, or Bulgaria’sBoyko Borissov –as well as otherEuropean populists– are indeedshaping the EU onmatters such asimmigration andenlargement. Poland is even throwing into question fundamental European values with its reforms on abortion. Still today, national culture guides policy-making and interstate relations more than we think, even in the EU – perhaps THE best embodiment around the world of globalisation and transnational cooperation. It remains to be seen whether this “culturalisation” of diplomacy and politics will pervade the EU and profoundly change it from within, or whether the EU will resist and “stay its liberal, pro-globalisation course”.