Trump(ing) East Asia; US Election on Asian Security

Joe Yiu Ip is a first-year Politics and International Relations student. Interested in various areas of geopolitics, including specific areas of conflict and the relationship of the West with East Asia. (www.linkedin.com/in/joeyiuip)

Introduction

East Asia has been seen as an area of great economic and strategic importance to the West, producing many of the world’s electronics, clothing, and consumer goods; the East Asia and Pacific region exported $8.05tn in 2022 (WITS, 2022). This power over global trade means it is also a chokepoint for the delivery of goods to the West, so maintaining relations and security agreements is paramount. We saw this chokehold take effect during the COVID-19 pandemic, with many factories shut down, the price of goods and PPE skyrocketed as governments scrambled to set up supply chains, and overall global trade fell 8.9% in 2020 (Bank of England, 2021). Therefore, the proof of the matter has secured thought in protecting this region from hostility to ensure trade routes are stable. The US, for example, seeks to combat China's influence in the area, having several alliances with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and ASEAN nations with military, economic, and social implications (US Department of State, 2020-2024)

Key issues voters faced within the US Election that took place in November 2024 were over the economy (81%) and foreign policy (62%), there was also disparity on these issues between Kamala and Trump supporters: 68% vs 91%, and 54% vs 70% respectively (Pew Research Center, 2024). This took place in Trump’s rhetoric during his campaign and what policies he looked to implement, 20-60% tariffs on all Chinese imports are most notable and see the US becoming more antagonistic towards China (Thornton, 2024). Looking towards East Asia, Trump’s amicable relationship with Kim Jong-Un may worry nations like South Korea, as the DPRK no longer seeks reunification with, but rather an annihilation of the ROK, and this can threaten their security (ibid.). Security arrangements will be a pertinent issue for East Asian nations as they wait for what direction Trump’s administration will take on foreign policy and security spending alongside bolstering regional ties in case of reduced funding or support (ibid.).

In this article, I will discuss US-aligned partners in the region, their history with the US, what current policy they have with the US, how this might change, and what could occur under a Trump administration.

Japan

A brief history of the nation’s relation with the US in the modern era. In World War II, they allied with Nazi Germany and launched an attack on the US in 1941 on the US Pacific Fleet stationed in Honolulu to set up a buffer in protecting their empire; following this, they launched attacks on allied forces in Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaya. After a few years of war, following deadly conflict, capture, and bombings, the US dropped two nuclear bombs in mid-August 1945, leading to Japan’s complete surrender to Allied forces and the Allied occupation of Japan. Since then, however, Japan has maintained a strong relationship with the USA, with both nations having bilateral trade and security agreements in place (US Department of State, 2020-2024). 

Currently, the US maintains 15 major military bases and 55,000 active-duty troops in Japan, mostly based in Okinawa (Congressional Research Service, 2024b). The government of Japan is regularly consulted in matters relating to North Korea (DPRK) and advancing dialogue in Southeast Asia on maritime issues (US Department of State, 2020-2024). The two nations cooperate on many global issues, such as areas of development, health, and technology, with major research projects and economic ties. Trade agreements like the U.S.-Japan Trade agreement eliminate or reduce tariffs on $7.2bn of U.S. Agricultural exports (ibid.). The Digital Trade Agreement allowing easier data transfer between the two countries has boosted the digital sector for both nations, too, running on an already large sector (ibid.).

Now to Trump, in his previous administration, we saw a largely 80s style American foreign policy, placing ‘America First’. He has previously stated his general criticism of Japan, arguing that the nation did not pay its fair share for the US Defence structure in 1988 (O’Shea and Maslow, 2020). This was repeated in 2018 when he jabbed at Japan during his formal announcement of tariffs in China, some of this anti-alliance rhetoric materialised in the US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2016 (ibid.). Given this history and Trump’s further rhetoric on US spending abroad in Ukraine, we are likely again to see a period of uneasiness for Japan as a strategic military and economic partner of the US as it has to choose how to manage this new old relationship (ibid.)

I can see that there may be issues for Japan in the future as tariffs and anti-alliance policies come out of the 2nd Trump administration, such as the threat to “kill” the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity in which Japan is deeply invested (ibid., RealEcon and Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies, 2024). Of much concern is security, which is threatened by the aforementioned rhetoric and policy of the Trump administration; a likely softer approach to the DPRK and China’s aggression militarily in the South and East China seas may leave the region vulnerable (ibid.).

Taiwan

Historically, the current government of the island was formed by the exiled Republic of China (ROC) in 1949, which lost a war against the People’s Republic of China (PRC) when communism pushed into the region and resumed the Chinese Civil War after the end of Japanese occupation at the end of WWII. Rapid industrialisation in the 1960s and relatively amicable relations with other nations saw the island become one of the top producers of tech, including high-performance semiconductor chips. Relations with the US during the early Cold War saw the deployment of nuclear weapons to Taiwan and the signing of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which allowed unofficial relations with the administration of Taiwan through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) (US Department of State, 2020-2024).

Currently, relations are still conducted through the AIT under the US ‘one China policy’. Despite not formally supporting any change to the status quo in the region, the United States will provide self-defence capabilities to the ROC to reasonably protect its social or economic way of life (ibid.). As one of the world’s largest producers of semiconductor chips, some of which cannot be produced outside of Taiwan, they are an integral part of technology worldwide and, therefore, highly sought after (ibid.). With the US being a key partner in ensuring the security of this supply chain and their economy, therefore providing self-defence for the island is key in this strategy. Furthermore, the ROC’s proximity to the PRC provides it with a unique military position which the US would like to maintain to counter China’s aggression in the region.

In 2016, Trump was dubious of protecting America’s partners, including Taiwan, even going so far as to suggest using the island as leverage to secure concessions on trade from China and North Korea (Bush and Hass, 2024). Reiterating claims the US does not get as much back from allied nations as the US provides them, although there was an effort to normalise arms sales (e.g. early warning radars, high-speed anti-radiation missiles, and torpedoes) to Taiwan with the reformation of review and approval of such sales reaching a peak of $10.7bn in 2019 (ibid., Copper, 2017). Trump’s history of policy and rhetoric on Taiwan is paradoxical, and we may not be able to predict the future of U.S.-Taiwan relations under a second Trump administration. However, Trump will likely look towards securing a better transactional relationship between the two partners, including possibly trying to move some semiconductor production to the U.S. to shore up US businesses. This may mean Taiwan having to give up more of its economic sector in return for security under the US protectorate (Bush and Hass, 2024).

South Korea

During the Cold War, the US supported the South Koreans (ROK) against the USSR-backed North Koreans (DPRK) in the Korean War. In the end, both nations agreed to a ceasefire but are still technically at war. Since then, the US has aligned with the ROK, providing military assistance and sanctioning the DPRK when it has broken international laws and restrictions on nuclear proliferation. (US Department of State, 2020-2024).

Currently, 28,500 U.S. troops are based in South Korea as part of their Mutual Defense Treaty, which was signed in 1953. They also are strong trading partners, with the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (2012) bringing economic collaboration, the US being South Korea’s 2nd largest trading partner in 2023 (Congressional Research Service, 2024a). With both the US and Japan, the nations have partnered to anticipate and protect against North Korean missile strikes and aggression in the region, announcing trilateral consultations and collaboration enhancing security around the Sea of Japan/East Sea.

The ’America First’ policy implemented under Trump’s first presidency included renegotiating deals with South Korea, such as their free trade agreement, and the Export Control Reform Act (2018), which gave further control to the US to include measures such as the Foreign-Direct Product Rule which restricted ROK firms’ access to markets like China if produced with US tech (Kim, 2024a). Effectively, as mentioned previously, Trump sought to control US allies to justify the defence spending they gave them. The ROK will likely have to support US decisions to maintain their economy with shocks hitting the Won after the results come out. Diplomatic resources are mobilising to meet Trump aides (Kim, 2024b). The nation will be looking towards increasing defence spending to shoulder additional costs asked of the US and to shore up security if the US were to negotiate a deal with the DPRK (Moon, 2024)

South China Sea

An area of territorial contention, even the name of this body of water, is contested by those surrounding it. China often takes a dominant approach to the area, placing its warships close to the maritime bases of other nations or blockading fishermen from SE Asian nations from fishing there. It claims the resources are exclusive to China and does not want to share (Center for Preventive Action, 2024).

The US remains partners with many nations in the region, often acting as a backer against China’s influence in the region and its resources (ibid.). As a major route for trade and military traffic, the US would see a threat to their interests if China were to grow its influence in the region. Therefore, they have reacted strongly towards claims (Swaine, 2015). However, some analysts argue America doesn’t do enough to protect the sovereignty of nations like Vietnam and the Philippines; rather, it tends to send strong rhetoric rather than firmly fighting back against China (ibid.). Recently, the Philippines and the US struck an intelligence-sharing deal and a new command and control centre, which will become a base for defence planning in the region (Lariosa, 2024).

Trump had largely avoided a major conflict in the South China Sea in his first presidency, but the tide has risen since then, and China’s battlements in the region have increased, with skirmishes between nations becoming more frequent and violent (Spirlet, 2024). Although there has not been a US intervention as under a treaty with the Philippines due to the lack of ‘armed’ conflict, it remains Trump will have to ensure security in the region as it is deeply entangled with US trade (ibid.). Another interested ally in the region, Vietnam, is also cautious of a second Trump administration, it sees itself as a target of Trump’s overzealous tariff policies and, therefore, could look to strengthen relations with China instead if they continue a protectionist outlook which could damage American interests and their security (Huld, 2024).

Conclusion

In conclusion, the result of the American election has led US allies to become cautious in their security, as Trump pursues protectionist, ‘America First’ policies, East Asia is having to shore up their defences and security in preparation for increasingly difficult costs associated with allying with the US. Japan, South Korea (ROK), and Taiwan, key allies of the US, will be asked to give more back to the States as payment for the military ‘services’ they provide, which could include giving economic concessions. Meanwhile, in the South China Sea, Vietnam and the Philippines hope their key strategic location amongst valued trade and military routes will protect them from the additional costs the Trump administration asks. Perhaps we will see America’s withdrawal from being the global police certainly, this is what the American public sees (Bokat-Lindell, 2021).