Rise and Fall of Kurdish Autonomy in Syria

Vasil Atanasov is a second-year Politics and International Relations student.

Passionate about interstate conflict, with a particular interest in understanding

the process of conflict resolution and sustainable peacebuilding. (linkedin.com/in/vasil-atanasov-/)

Introduction

In January 2026, after being in control of Syria’s northeastern region for more than a decade, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) would suddenly lose most of the territory due to a government offensive. Once a champion of the fight against ISIS and a crucial US ally, the Syrian Kurds are now in a difficult position, facing uncertain integration into a new Syria. This article explores the rise and recent downfall of Rojava, the Kurdish autonomous region in Syria.

Who are the Kurds?

The Kurds are a distinct ethnic group, predominantly Sunni Muslim, native to Kurdistan — a mountainous region spanning parts of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria[ 1]. With a population of around 30–40 million, they are often described as the world’s largest nation without a state. Experiences of repression and struggles for autonomy have shaped Kurdish history across the region. In Turkey, home to roughly half of the Kurdish population, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has fought the state since the 1980s, only recently agreeing to disarm as part of a peace process [2]. In Iran, although conflict has generally been less intense, discrimination has persisted, and the militant PJAK remains active [3]. In Iraq, following decades of conflict and U.S. intervention, Iraqi Kurds established an autonomous region in 1991, formally recognised in 2005 after the fall of Saddam Hussein [1].

In Syria, however, there had not been an organised armed struggle until the 2011 civil war. Around 2 million Kurds live in Syria, mostly inhabiting the northern and resource-rich northeastern regions of the country [4]. As elsewhere, their cultural identity and political rights were repressed. In 1962, about 120,000 Kurds were stripped of citizenship, eventually leading to an estimated 300,000 stateless Kurds in Syria by 2011 [5]. In the 1970s, the Arab Belt project displaced tens of thousands of native Kurds to repopulate the area with Arabs [5]. Although Kurdish political parties had existed prior to 2011, they were unable to challenge the regime [6]. Tensions escalated in 2004 with the violent crackdown on the Kurdish riots in Qamishli, marking a turning point [4]. However, it will only be with the outbreak of the civil war seven years later that the Kurds will be able to drastically alter the status quo.

The civil war and Kurdish autonomy

In 2011, inspired by the Arab Spring, the Syrian people took to the streets to protest the unpopular Assad government. The regime’s brutal crackdown would escalate to a notoriously complex 13-year-long civil war, claiming around 580,000 lives. For their part, the Syrian Kurds took action early in the conflict. In 2012, due to the more pressing rebel threat in the west, the government redrew its forces from the northeastern region, enabling the Kurds to swiftly seize the territory [7]. The effort was primarily led by the Democratic Union Party (PYD), a PKK offshoot, and its military wing, the YPG [8]. These actions laid the foundation for the establishment of the autonomous region of Rojava, a de facto Kurdish-governed entity, in 2013.

Rojava was in many respects a unique political project. Its governing model drew on the political philosophy of Abdullah Öcalan, a leftist thinker and founder of the PKK [9]. The founding block was democratic confederalism, advocating decentralised, grassroots self-governance through local councils and communities [10]. The PYD would also emphasise its commitment to political, cultural and religious freedoms. Feminism was also a core part, symbolised by the YPJ, the all-female branch of the security forces [11]. Importantly, throughout its existence, Rojava’s leadership never really pursued full sovereignty, but rather argued for integration as an autonomous region in a future decentralised and democratic Syria [9].

Although Rojava was praised for its aspiration towards democracy and freedom, it also faced criticism. First, it had been accused of tacit collaboration with the Assad regime, as some argue the two agreed to focus on the rebel and Islamist threats rather than each other [12]. Second, the YPG, later transforming into the SDF, had been accused of running an authoritarian military regime. There were cases, particularly in the Arab-majority areas, of false arrests, state censorship, and recruitment of child soldiers [13]. Nonetheless, the SDF would be able to sustain its domestic leadership, in no small part due to the unifying role of the serious external threats it had to face.

The struggle that solidified Rojava’s position and brought it international recognition was the fight against ISIS [7]. The chaos of the Syrian civil war enabled ISIS’s rise, which by 2015 would come to control a territory encompassing 12 million people (14). The Kurds would, at times, such as the siege of Kobani in 2014, face an existential threat from the group. Nevertheless, the danger ISIS posed to the wider region also secured Rojava its most valuable asset: American military support. Starting in 2014, the United States would directly support the Kurds as part of a broader coalition against ISIS. The SDF proved to be a driving force behind the eventual defeat of ISIS in 2019, solidifying itself as a regional power backed by strong US support [7]. Nevertheless, as fate would have it, it would be the US that, a few years later, would sanction the end of Kurdish autonomy.

While the threat of Islamic terrorism had the most profound impact on Syrian Kurds, arguably, in the long run, the most dangerous adversary had always been Turkey. Historically, the Turkish state has seen Kurdish autonomy, whether at home or abroad, as a serious threat to its security [15]. Rojava was no different, and therefore, Ankara would attempt to undermine it from the outset. Eventually, in 2016, 2018 and 2019, Turkey would launch major military operations into northern Syria, seizing SDF territory [16]. Turkey’s actions would, unsurprisingly, regularly put it at odds with its NATO ally, the US. Regardless, eventually, a shifting power balance in Syria would finally allow President Erdogan help orchestrate the demise of the SDF.

Kurdish future in a post-Assad Syria

To the surprise of many, in December of 2024, the Assad regime was finally toppled in a swift offensive by the Islamist Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Turkish-backed rebels. Syria has since been led by Ahmed Al Shara, HTS’s leader, who aims to unite the country. Backed strongly by Turkey, Al Sharaa has been able to consolidate domestic power while also altering Syria’s foreign policy, most notably securing US support for his project. For the Kurds, these developments drastically changed the playing field. Although agreements in March 2025 outlined the integration of Rojava and the SDF into a new Syrian state, implementation stalled, and clashes resumed. Eventually, in January of 2026, the new government, supported by Turkey and, crucially, the United States, launched a military operation seizing the majority of SDF-controlled territory [17]. On 30th January, a new US-brokered agreement was finalised, ending the fighting and following on previous integration efforts, confirming the course towards a centralised Syria [18].

Currently, the Syrian Kurds find themselves in a complicated position. On the one hand, unrestricted Kurdish autonomy and independent military force are over, as the geopolitical situation has fundamentally shifted in favour of a strong, centralised Syrian state. Additionally, there is still uncertainty regarding successful integration, which has not been helped by the new government’s controversial handling of issues surrounding the Alawite and Druze minorities [19]. On the other hand, Al Sharaa has vowed—albeit only in a decree—that Kurds would receive full rights and be integral to Syria’s governance [20]. That is, after all, in his own interest if the goal is long-term stability. Although real autonomy is gone, some form of administrative capacity is still likely for the Kurdish-dominated areas. Furthermore, the broader agenda, though highly uncertain, is for Syria to eventually transition into a democracy [21]. While not a perfect scenario, the Kurds could still potentially be better off than they were prior to 2011.

Arguably, Turkey is the real winner in this story, as it has solidified its influence in Syria and, more importantly, ended the Kurdish threat. For the US, the recent developments should not be seen as a foolproof solution to Syria’s instability. While the Kurds have now been compelled to accept the new reality, if key promises are not fulfilled, there is a high likelihood that conflict could reignite, albeit not at the levels seen during the civil war. Furthermore, there have been reports of a re-emergence of ISIS, a problem that no side would want to exacerbate [22]. The current situation is delicate, and continued US involvement—in the form of pressure on both sides—would be crucial to ensuring stability.

Conclusion

The civil war presented the Syrian Kurds with the unique opportunity to create and sustain a truly autonomous entity, forever reshaping their identity. While Rojava is no more and the future remains uncertain, there is a chance that the new Syria could prove to be better than the pre-revolution one, encompassing some of the principles fought for during the war. Regardless, the path forward goes through cooperation.

Works Cited

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