French Foreign Policy Post-2027: Continuity or Change?

James Wheatley is a third-year European Social and Political Studies student. He has interned with The Borgen Project and recently graduated from the FT News School. (linkedin.com/in/jameswheatley860)

The Direction of French Foreign Policy under Macron

Whilst Emmanuel Macron’s presidency has been dominated by domestic instability, exacerbated by the 2024 legislative elections, the nature of presidential powers in France has allowed him significant influence over foreign policy. While domestic matters are usually the responsibility of the prime minister, foreign policy has traditionally been an area reserved for the president and therefore largely ‘immune to parliamentary volatility’ [1].

In his 2017 Sorbonne speech, he articulated his commitment to “European sovereignty’, a theme that has since become the cornerstone of French foreign policy. Indeed, Macron has ‘consistently pushed for the wake-up of Europe’ [2], keen for France to lead a European project that stands alongside the U.S. and China as a major power, not as a passive spectator.

The defence pact with Greece and the Quirinal Treaty, both signed in 2021, underlined Macron’s desire to reduce European reliance on the U.S. in defence, and his willingness to pursue bilateral arrangements. The president has frequently called for increased commitment from NATO partners; declaring the organisation to be experiencing a ‘brain death’ in a 2019 interview with The Economist [3].

If European sovereignty has been Macron’s central focus, it has only gained renewed urgency in light of the ‘Greenland moment’, which Macron hopes will demonstrate that Europe must cut its dependence on the US and implement the reforms to do so [4].

The war in Ukraine has provided an opportunity for France and Europe to step out of the U.S.’s shadow and play a leading role in shaping the continent’s future. Initially attempting to play mediator between Russia and Ukraine, since the former’s invasion of the latter in February 2022, France has emerged as one of Ukraine’s most ardent political and financial supporters [5]. Macron has consistently advocated for Ukraine’s EU membership, illustrating his belief in a European project that includes, rather than excludes, Ukraine.

Macron’s record thus reflects a push for a more muscular French foreign policy and for greater European autonomy. The 2027 presidential election will determine whether France maintains this trajectory or charts a new one.

2027 in Focus: The Race to the Élysée

Despite the lack of clarity in the French political arena, one thing is certain—Macron cannot run in 2027. Who will replace him, however, remains far less clear, with several potential candidates yet to formally declare their intentions. This, compounded by Macron’s 2017 victory, which disrupted the traditional political duopoly of the Republicans and the Socialists, has made identifying a clear frontrunner difficult.

Continuity from the Centre: The Two Prime Ministers

Two former Macron prime ministers, Édouard Philippe and Gabriel Attal, appear best placed to offer continuity in French foreign policy.

Philippe, leader of Horizons which sits with Renaissance within the centrist Ensemble coalition, formally declared his candidacy in September 2024. Attal, by contrast, has remained tight-lipped, unsurprising considering his proximity to the current administration. Yet, there is an expectation that he will run, and a belief that he could reconnect Renaissance with a more liberal base.

Amid Macron’s slumping approval ratings, both men have taken steps to distance themselves from the president. Philippe has called on Macron to hold the presidential election early to resolve the legislative gridlock in the National Assembly [6], while Attal has diverged on certain foreign policy issues, calling Macron’s recognition of Palestinian statehood and his proposed two-state solution unfeasible [7].

Despite this, both Philippe and Attal remain firmly committed to Macron’s central foreign policy objectives: European sovereignty, strategic autonomy, and support for Ukraine. In March 2025, Attal organised a summit that reaffirmed France’s commitment to seizing Russian assets and accelerating Ukraine’s path to EU membership [8], while Philippe, in remarks to the IIEA, echoed Macron’s call for Europe to assert its autonomy and to accept that it must, like the US and China, prioritise its own interests [9].

Ultimately, on foreign policy, Philippe and Attal remain firmly aligned with their old boss. Their ability to distinguish themselves from Macron’s less popular policies, and to carve out their own distinct political identities, depends on how effectively they can break from him on the domestic policy front.

The Question Facing the Left: To Unite or to Divide?

If the 2024 legislative elections constituted a success for any political camp, it was the left. The New Popular Front, a coalition of left-wing parties, unexpectedly emerged with the largest number of seats in the National Assembly.

While Marine Tondelier and François Ruffin have called for a cross-party primary to select a unity candidate, the two frontrunners—Raphaël Glucksmann and Jean-Luc Mélenchon—have dismissed the idea [10].

Glucksmann, a strong advocate for Ukraine and the European project and the leading candidate from the moderate left, shares Macron’s central focus. In a February 2025 op-ed, Glucksmann referred to Ukraine as France’s ‘first line of defense’ and reiterated calls for greater European autonomy in security matters [11]. Liberated by his role outside of government, Glucksmann has also been vocal in his criticism of the Trump presidency, taking to X to lash out at the administration in March 2025 [12].

Distaste for Trump is shared by Mélenchon, who, despite his staunch opposition to Macron, has backed the president’s rejection of Trump’s Gaza “Board of Peace”, suggesting that deteriorating Franco-American relations could, to some extent, unite French parties across the political spectrum [13].

Yet, despite this “common enemy”, the two camps remain ideologically orthogonal. For Glucksmann and Macron, the unpredictability of the U.S. reinforces the need for greater Europe security autonomy. Their stance is not a rejection of NATO, but a recognition that Europe must establish a similar structure if the U.S. can no longer be relied upon as it once was. Mélenchon, by contrast, is a long-standing critic of NATO and has courted controversy for past statements which appeared to partly blame NATO for the 2014 annexation of Crimea [14]. Although Mélenchon has walked back this sentiment, critics warn of the consequences for Ukraine and the European project under a Mélenchon presidency.

The choice between Glucksmann and Mélenchon also carries consequences for Franco-Israeli relations. Glucksmann, though critical of Israeli actions, has faced backlash for his perceived reluctance to label them as genocide [15]. Mélenchon’s vocal support for the Palestinian cause, meanwhile, has drawn criticism, with Glucksmann himself questioning Mélenchon’s refusal to categorise Hamas as a terrorist organisation [16].

The View from the Right: Will Le Pen Run—and Does It Matter?

Where the left remains fractured, support on the right has coalesced around National Rally. Marine Le Pen, who reached the presidential run-off in both 2017 and 2022 as National Rally’s candidate, was polling around 35% in early 2025 [17]. However, in March 2025, Le Pen was handed a five-year ban from running for public office. Pending her appeal, Jordan Bardella, who led National Rally to victory in the 2024 European Parliament Elections, has emerged as her likely replacement.

Regardless of whether it is Le Pen or Bardella, their foreign policy agendas will likely overlap, despite shifts in the National Rally’s foreign policy stances. Talk of “Frexit” has been replaced by a more pragmatic approach to European integration, though the party remains opposed to the potential entanglement of French nuclear capabilities within a revised European security framework proposed by Macron [18].

One area of potential divergence is Russia. Le Pen, accused of harbouring pro-Kremlin sentiment, has stated that ‘it is incontestable that we should support Ukraine’ [19], but is more sceptical of sanctions on Russian oil and gas [20]. Bardella has been more forthright, labelling Russia a ‘multidimensional threat to the French and European interests’ [21]. Nonetheless, both oppose the deployment of French troops or missiles in Ukraine and reject Ukrainian EU membership.

A prospective Le Pen/Bardella presidency perhaps offers a cooler approach to the Macronist European project, rather than an outright departure. A different direction may be taken with regard to Israel. Historically associated with antisemitism, National Rally has emerged as one of Israel’s strongest defenders. Indeed, Le Pen criticised Macron’s recognition of Palestinian statehood as recognising a terrorist state [22].

Looking Ahead

Whilst the outcome of the 2027 presidential election will shape Europe’s future, characterising it as marking an abrupt departure from Macron’s pursuit of European sovereignty and strategic autonomy risks overstatement. Even candidates such as Jean-Luc Mélenchon and the principal figures from National Rally have moderated their rhetoric to appear electable, suggesting that an electoral victory for either party may usher in a cooling of French support for Ukraine and European defence integration, rather than absolute abandonment.

Where divergences are more pronounced is on Israel—Palestine. That being said, recent deteriorations in Franco-American relations may lead to some convergence across the political spectrum, with a recognition that national interests must supersede traditional alignments. Even National Rally, once thought of as a beneficiary of a Trump presidency, has chastised U.S. actions in Venezuela and towards Greenland [23], a sign perhaps of the party’s desire to avoid a similar fate to Pierre Poilievre in Canada last year.

Works Cited

[1] Forneris, E. (2025). Looking For France On the International Stage. [online] www.rusi.org. Available at: https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/looking-france-international-stage.

[2]Aghion, P. (2025). Interview with Economist Philippe Aghion: ‘Macron’s legacy will be better than people think’. [online] Financial Times. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/d9a5c4f7-6ed1-4ebf-98c4-b582c927f240.

[3] The Economist. (2019). Interview: Emmanuel Macron in his own words (English). [online] www.economist.com. Available at: https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-in-his-own-words-english?utm_campaign=shared_article.

[4] The Economist. (2026). Emmanuel Macron Declares a European State of Emergency. [online] www.economist.com. Available at: https://www.economist.com/europe/2026/02/10/emmanuel-macron-declares-a-european-state-of-emergency

[5] Kiel Institute for the World Economy. (n.d.). Ukraine Support Tracker. Available at: https://www.kielinstitut.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/.

[6] Basem, S. (2025). Ex-French PM Edouard Philippe urges Emmanuel Macron to hold early elections. [online] brusselsmorning.com. Available at: https://brusselsmorning.com/ex-french-pm-edouard-philippe-urges-emmanuel-macron-to-hold-early-elections/80135/.

[7] Hayom, I. (2025). Former French PM: I didn’t agree with every decision made by Macron. [online] www.jns.org. Available at: https://www.jns.org/former-french-pm-i-didnt-agree-with-every-decision-made-by-macron/.

[8] Attal, G. (2025). Interview with Gabriel Attal—‘We are waking from a long sleep’: France’s ex-PM Gabriel Attal on revitalising relations with the UK. [online] www.theguardian.com. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/23/gabriel-attal-interview-uk-france-relations-macron.

[9] Philippe, E. (2025). Remarks at the IIEA: The Place of France and the EU in the Face of Global Upheavals. [video] YouTube. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VUC9oLHqkV8.

[10] Chrisafis, A. (2025). Interview with Clémentine Autain—‘We have to end the melancholy’: the French leftwing MP intent on resisting the far right. [online] www.theguardian.com. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/dec/06/clementine-autain-french-leftwing-mp-intent-resisting-far-right-france.

[11] Glucksmann, R. (2025). The small steps favored by European leaders are no longer enough, we need a giant leap. [online] www.lemonde.fr/en. Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2025/02/23/raphael-glucksmann-mep-the-small-steps-favored-by-european-leaders-are-no-longer-enough-we-need-a-giant-leap_6738458_23.html.

[12] Glucksmann, R. [rglucks1]. (2025). Dear Americans, Since the White House press secretary is attacking me today, I wanted to tell you this… [online] https://x.com. Available at: https://x.com/rglucks1/status/1901748979236217146.

[13] Carriat, J. & Pedro, A. (2026). French parties briefly rally around Macron after Trump’s attacks. [online] www.lemonde.fr/en. Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2026/01/22/french-parties-briefly-rally-around-macron-after-trump-s-attacks_6749685_5.html?random=605125296.

[14] Mélenchon, J. (2014). France: Parti de gauche leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon on Ukraine, translated by Dick Nichols. Available at: https://links.org.au/france-parti-de-gauche-leader-jean-luc-melenchon-ukraine.

[15] BFMTV. (2024). Gaza: Raphaël Glucksmann refuse le terme de génocide, mais dénonce un carnage. [online] www.bfmtv.com. Available at: https://www.bfmtv.com/politique/parti-socialiste/gaza-raphael-glucksmann-refuse-le-terme-de-genocide-mais-denonce-un-carnage_AD-202403120343.html.

[16] Glucksmann, R. (2025). Interview with French MEP Raphaël Glucksmann: ‘I will not take part in a primary’ for the 2027 presidential election. [online]. www.lemonde.fr/en. Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2025/05/28/french-mep-raphael-glucksmann-i-will-not-take-part-in-a-primary-for-the-2027-presidential-election_6741757_5.html.

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[18] Ambrose, T., Chao-Fong, L. & Krupa, J. (2025). Macron open to extending France’s nuclear umbrella to European allies as US reconsiders Ukraine funding – as it happened. [blog] www.theguardian.com. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2025/mar/05/donald-trump-volodymyr-zelenksyy-ukraine-russia-greenland-tariffs-europe-live-news.

[19] Forneris, E. (2025). Looking For France On the International Stage. [online] www.rusi.org. Available at: https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/looking-france-international-stage.

[20] BBC News. (2022). Marine Le Pen says she opposes sanctions on Russian gas. [online] www.bbc.com. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61073894.

[21] Bardella, J. (2025). Political Thinking with Nick Robinson—Jordan Bardella: The 30-year-old populist hoping to be France’s next president. [podcast] www.bbc.co.uk. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/m002p0j6.

[22] France24. (2025). France defends move to recognise Palestinian state. [online] www.france24.com/en. Available at: https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250725-france-defends-move-to-recognise-palestinian-state.

[23] Solletty, M. (2026). French far-right leader Bardella slams Trump’s ‘imperial ambitions’ in Greenland, Venezuela. [online] www.politico.eu. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/france-jordan-bardella-donald-trumps-imperial-ambitions-in-venezuela-greenland/.