Competition in the Red Sea: Israel’s Recognition of Somaliland

Natalia Modla is a second-year Politics, Sociology and Eastern European Studies student at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at UCL.

(Email: nataliamodla29@gmail.com/LinkedIn: Natalia Modla)

Introduction

On 26 December 2025, Israel recognised Somaliland, the self-declared state in northern Somalia that has functioned with de facto autonomy since 1991 [1], becoming the first country to do so. The announcement was immediately contentious. Somalia’s President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, denounced the decision as an existential threat to Somalia’s territorial unity, underscoring the enduring sensitivity surrounding sovereignty in the Horn of Africa [5]. This article examines what Israel’s recognition means for Somaliland’s political and economic future, the strategic calculations that may have informed Israel’s decision, and the developmental implications of a formalised relationship between the two. It argues that recognition operates not merely as a diplomatic gesture but as a strategic instrument. For Somaliland, this relationship is a potential gateway to greater economic engagement and international visibility. For Israel, the recognition is a national-security measure and a means of consolidating influence amid intensifying competition among external powers in the Red Sea corridor.

Somaliland: Background

Somaliland is a de facto breakaway territory in northern Somalia, unrecognised by the United Nations, with a population of roughly six million. It declared independence in 1991 after the collapse of Siad Barre’s military regime [5]. Since then, it has experienced comparatively greater peace and stability than southern Somalia, which has continued to face attacks from militant Islamist groups [5]. Over time, Somaliland has developed its own political institutions, including a distinct political identity, flag, parliament and currency [1]. Tensions nevertheless remain, particularly in parts of the eastern regions, where some communities question or resist the separatist project. Geographically, Somaliland sits along the Gulf of Aden at the Horn of Africa, adjacent to the Red Sea corridor [4]. With approximately 12 per cent of global trade passing through this maritime route each year [2], its location carries clear strategic weight. Despite functioning autonomously since 1991, Somaliland has remained unrecognised internationally. This reflects continued adherence to Somalia’s territorial integrity under international law, as reinforced by the UN Charter, the African Union Constitutive Act and the 1964 Cairo Declaration [2], all of which affirm Somalia’s status as a single sovereign state.

Somaliland and Israel: Key Dimensions

The recognition of Somaliland by Israel translates into closer economic, diplomatic and potentially security cooperation between the two. Israel has pledged collaboration in agriculture, health, technology and broader economic development [5], signalling that the relationship is intended to extend beyond recognition. Agriculture is a central area of prospective cooperation. Israel’s experience in arid-zone farming, particularly through the development of drip-irrigation systems, has in some areas increased yields by 200–300 per cent in water-scarce regions [2]. Applied effectively, such expertise could help improve Somaliland’s agricultural productivity and food resilience. In addition, planned civilian cooperation programmes reportedly include support in water management, agricultural modernisation and information technology [6], sectors relevant to Somaliland’s long-term development. Diplomatically, formal recognition opens the door to the establishment of official missions and structured bilateral agreements. For Somaliland, which has long sought international legitimacy, even a limited network of recognised partnerships strengthens its perceived legitimacy on an international stage.

On the security front, Israel may establish a diplomatic presence with potential security dimensions in the region [6]. While Somaliland maintains its own armed forces, its defence budget remains small. A potential security partnership could enhance Somaliland’s security capacity while also strengthening Israel’s strategic position in the Red Sea region. Given Somaliland’s limited military budget, cooperation with Israel may provide intelligence-sharing and access to naval and air bases [6], increasing Somaliland’s security capabilities. From Israel’s perspective, engagement in Somaliland would also carry broader strategic implications. According to the Israeli think tank, the Institute for National Security Studies [5], regional positioning may be relevant to future campaigns against the Houthis. Although the IDF has not indicated any intention to establish a permanent base in Somaliland, it is reported to be seeking access for monitoring purposes, potentially enabling earlier warning of incoming threats [6]. The relationship, therefore, appears to provide mutual benefits as Somaliland receives assistance that may bolster its security and development, while Israel enhances its strategic capabilities in a critical maritime corridor.

Criticisms

However, Israel’s decision has been widely criticised because recognising Somaliland does not align with the UN Charter and appears driven by strategic self-interest. Article 2 of the UN Charter upholds the principle of territorial integrity, and in Africa, this has been reinforced by post-colonial agreements preserving inherited borders as inviolable [3]. In this context, recognition is seen as moving away from established international norms regarding Somalia’s sovereignty. The criticism also reflects concerns about motive. As the Interior Minister of Puntland, Somalia’s semi-autonomous region, stated, recognition risks becoming transactional rather than based on principle [1]. If recognition is shaped by strategic calculation, it introduces a geopolitical dimension to the treatment of de facto states that remain unrecognised elsewhere, which threaten the sovereignty of states. Through this move, Israel has secured a greater presence in the Red Sea, a region of clear strategic and economic importance, while appearing to depart from established legal norms. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson similarly criticised the decision as “encourag(ing) or support(ing) other country’s internal separatist forces for its own selfish interest” [5]. The controversy, therefore centres not only on Somaliland, but on the broader implications for international law and the principles governing recognition.

Regional Power Competition and The Strategic Importance of the Red Sea

Moreover, given the Red Sea’s economic and security importance, Somaliland’s location places it within a wider arena of global competition. The corridor’s strategic significance has drawn external powers seeking influence and access along one of the world’s most vital maritime routes. According to Cameron Hudson, a US-based Africa analyst, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is driven primarily by the objective of countering Iran’s influence in the Red Sea [5]. This interpretation aligns with Israel’s sustained efforts to secure a foothold along this corridor. Earlier attempts to bring Somalia into the Abraham Accords similarly reflect the weight Israel attaches to Red Sea positioning. In 2016, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to explore prospects for recognition and normalisation. However, as al-Shabab intensified its offensive and Somalia’s security environment deteriorated, Mogadishu became increasingly reliant on military support from Turkey and Qatar [6]. According to the Washington Institute, this shift contributed to the collapse of talks with Israel [6]. The subsequent turn toward Somaliland, therefore, reflects continuity in Israel’s strategic approach: even as relations with Mogadishu faltered, Israel appears intent on maintaining influence in the Red Sea region in order to counter Iran.

Somaliland may also serve as an arena for further alignment between Israel and certain Arab states. Hudson suggests the move reflects a growing convergence between Israeli and Emirati interests in the Red Sea [5]. Although several states have commented on the recognition, the United Arab Emirates has remained publicly silent, despite maintaining a military port in Somaliland [5]. Both Israel and the UAE appear to view Somaliland as a strategic actor capable of shaping, and potentially counterbalancing, the influence of Turkey and Saudi Arabia in the region [4]. In this sense, Somaliland becomes more than a bilateral partner; it emerges as a platform through which external powers project and contest influence along a critical maritime corridor.

Conclusion

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is more than a symbolic gesture. For Somaliland, it opens the possibility of greater economic engagement and international visibility. For Israel, it secures a strategic foothold in an increasingly contested Red Sea region. At the same time, the move feeds into a wider regional power play, as external actors compete for influence along an important route. Whether this recognition remains an isolated development or reshapes regional alignments will depend on how other powers respond.

Works Cited

[1] Ali, F. (2025). Israel becomes first country to recognise Somaliland. [online] Al Jazeera. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/26/israel-becomes-first-country-to-recognise-somaliland.

[2] Assefa, M. (2026). Israel’s Recognition of Somaliland and its Implications for Regional Peace and Development | Atlas Institute for International Affairs. [online] Atlas Institute for International Affairs. Available at: https://atlasinstitute.org/israels-recognition-of-somaliland-and-its-implications-for-regional-peace-and-development/.

[3] Badawi, H. (2026). The Illegal Fragmentation of Somalia: Israeli Recognition of Somaliland and the Violation of International Law. Horn of Africa Journal of Social Science, 4(Special Issue), pp.1–13. doi:https://doi.org/10.70806/eh2wa793.

[4] Donelli, F. (2026). Israel’s recognition of Somaliland: the strategic calculations at play. The Conversation. [online] doi:https://doi.org/10.64628/aaj.3rypmwh4k.

[5] Wedaeli Chibelushi, Ameyu Etana and Lamane, F. (2025). Somaliland: Why has Israel recognised the breakaway African state as independent? BBC News. [online] 29 Dec. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c14v4kmg275o.

[6] Yaari, E. (2026). Recognizing Somaliland: Israel’s Return to the Red Sea. [online] The Washington Institute. Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/recognizing-somaliland-israels-return-red-sea.