Bulgaria’s Endless Elections: From Protests to Power

Alis Sara is a first-year History, Politics, and Economics student at UCL. She is passionate about memory, post-communist transitions, and political alignment beyond conventional East-West divides, with hands-on exposure to political institutions through visits to multiple embassies and the UK Parliament.

Introduction

Bulgaria is preparing for its eighth parliamentary election since April 2021, a frequency that signals not just instability but a deeper crisis of democratic legitimacy. In less than five years, repeated elections and caretaker governments have normalised uncertainty at the core of the state. This turbulence coincides with high-stakes decisions: euro adoption in 2026, energy restructuring after Lukoil’s withdrawal, defence cooperation with Germany, and negotiations over North Macedonia’s EU path, areas that require continuity, Bulgaria has struggled to sustain.

In late 2025, mass protests again brought entrenched power structures into focus. The so-called “model Peevski”, shorthand for oligarchic influence and opaque governance associated with Delyan Peevski, became a central target. Public anger was fuelled by inflation, failing services, and road-safety scandals. The winter “#GenZRevolution” protests broadened into an indictment of corruption, the absence of a euro referendum, and perceived institutional capture. Tens of thousands demonstrated across major cities, contributing to the resignation of Prime Minister Rosen Zhelyazkov and the precedent voluntary resignation of President Rumen Radev, who signalled his intention to enter parliamentary politics. The question remains: can protest energy translate into structural reform, or has instability itself become the constant feature of Bulgaria’s democracy?

Structural weaknesses of the system

Bulgaria’s institutional design and recent constitutional changes help explain the recurring deadlocks. The unicameral National Assembly has 240 deputies elected by proportional representation in 31 multi‑member constituencies, with a 4% threshold and closed party lists that give voters little influence over individual candidates. In April 2021, six parties entered parliament and the largest, GERB–SDS, held just 75 of 240 seats with 25.8% of the vote, making coalition formation extremely difficult. Failure to form stable governments led to three elections in 2021 alone (April, July, November), followed by further contests in 2022, 2023, and June 2024.

Constitutional tinkering has often exacerbated instability. Between 2020 and 2023, amendments altered the balance of power between parliament and the presidency, including rules on appointing caretaker governments, traditionally a key stabilising mechanism when coalitions collapse. OSCE/ODIHR reports noted frequent last‑minute changes to electoral rules, including on machine voting and vote counting, undermining trust and creating perceptions of manipulation.

Political apathy and demographic decline magnify these institutional flaws. Bulgaria has experienced one of the steepest population losses in the EU; by 2023, the population had fallen by roughly 900,000 compared with 2007, driven by low birth rates and sustained emigration. Turnout has dropped sharply: April 2021 saw 49.1% participation, July 2021 40.39%, November 2021 38.43%, April 2023 40.69%, and June 2024 just 34.41% — the lowest since 1991. Analyses note that Bulgaria now regularly records the lowest turnout in the EU, which averages 67%. Surveys cited by the Wilson Centre report that only about a third of citizens express trust in parliament or parties, and over half believe that “no party represents them,” feeding abstention and cynicism.

Media capture, information gaps, and weak alternatives

The information environment is central to Bulgaria’s democratic malaise. Reporters Without Borders ranked Bulgaria 91st of 180 countries in its 2023 World Press Freedom Index, the worst position in the EU. RSF highlights high media concentration and opaque ownership, with Peevski‑linked businesses frequently cited as emblematic of political–business capture. Television, still the main news source, is particularly affected, and Alpha Research found that only 28% of citizens trust television news.

This media landscape distorts electoral competition. Party programmes are often vague or poorly communicated, overshadowed by personalistic campaigning and scandal coverage. Misinformation and political “spectacle” reinforce perceptions that all parties are interchangeable factions within a corrupt elite. According to Gallup International Balkan (December 2025), over 65% of Bulgarians believe “their vote does not matter.” Civic literacy remains weak: assessments of Bulgarian civic education point to limited emphasis on democratic institutions and citizens’ rights, while many young people rely primarily on social media for political information.​

Furthermore, the party system offers few sustained alternatives. Since 2021, anti‑corruption projects like There Is Such a People (ITN) and We Continue the Change (PP) have surged and then quickly faltered over coalition bargaining and clashes with entrenched institutions. Meanwhile, long‑standing parties such as GERB and DPS retain influence through local administrative networks and patronage. The nationalist‑populist Vazrazhdane has steadily grown; ahead of the June 2024 elections, it polled in the low‑to‑mid teens and consolidated third place, tapping into anti‑establishment and Eurosceptic sentiment. The result is “volatile stagnation”: constant reshuffling of party fortunes but continued dominance by a relatively narrow elite.

Protest, generational shifts, and civic potential

Protests function both as a safety valve and a potential engine of change. Bulgaria has seen repeated waves of mobilisation — anti‑corruption demonstrations in 2013–2014, anti‑Borisov protests in 2020, and sectoral protests by teachers, medical students, railway workers, and environmental activists. The 2025 “#GenZRevolution” belongs to this lineage but has distinct features. Deutsche Welle describes thousands of young Bulgarians rallying under slogans such as “Gen Z won’t stay silent,” targeting both the government and figures like Peevski. Triggered by budget decisions and cost‑of‑living pressures, the movement rapidly broadened into a rejection of oligarchic control, the non‑transparent adoption of the euro, and perceived collusion among established parties.

The New York Times reported that these protests “helped tip the balance” against Bulgaria’s leaders, contributing to the fall of the Zhelyazkov government. While core structural demands, such as a referendum on the euro, were unmet, the protests achieved visible outcomes: the cabinet’s fall, disruption of the budget timetable, and the re‑entry of youth voices into national debate.

They also shifted expectations. Think‑tank analyses drawing on Surveys by Open Society Institute Sofia (January 2026) show that 57% of young respondents (aged 18–29) now express interest in participating in elections — a 20% increase from 2023. The entrenched belief that “nothing ever changes” after protests has been weakened.

Prospects for reform and European implications

If Radev or another actor succeeds in channelling this civic energy into an electoral vehicle, structural obstacles will remain formidable. Analyses summarised by the Wilson Centre, alongside MarketLinks polling from February 2026, suggest that a Radev-aligned formation could attract around 30–32% of the vote under favourable conditions — enough to emerge as the largest force, ahead of GERB (11–14%) and Vazrazhdane (10–13%), yet well short of a parliamentary majority. GERB, DPS, and Vazrazhdane would likely retain a substantial presence, leaving any reformist cabinet vulnerable to obstruction and internal sabotage. The short‑lived Petkov government of 2022 showed how quickly anti‑corruption agendas can be derailed by institutional veto players and entrenched interests.

Bulgaria’s trajectory is intertwined with broader European and global dynamics. The Russia–Ukraine war has heightened scrutiny of Russian influence in energy and security policy while reinforcing the importance of EU and NATO membership. Simultaneously Doland Trump’s return and the shifts in political rhetoric create wider instability. Populist and nationalist forces across Europe — AfD in Germany, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in France, Giorgia Meloni’s government in Italy- all reveal that challenges of representation and polarisation are not confined to the Balkans.​

Yet Bulgaria offers a particular warning about the cumulative effects of media capture, demographic decline, and institutional manipulation on democratic confidence. Persistently low turnout, recurring early elections, and normalised caretaker governance risk producing a hybrid system where formal democratic procedures coexist with substantive elite continuity. For the EU, this raises difficult questions about democratic consolidation inside its own borders.

Between fragmentation and renewal

Despite bleak indicators, Bulgaria’s recent experience also showcases democratic resilience. New political realignments are emerging, and a younger generation aspires to achieve the transformation their parents struggled to secure after 1989 — as the saying goes, from svoboda to svobodia. The question is not whether Bulgaria has the potential to become sovereign and stable, but whether it is prepared to undertake the institutional responsibility required to achieve it. Stability cannot be built while simultaneously oscillating between external pressures and unresolved internal weaknesses.

The stakes extend beyond Bulgaria.

The first half of this decade has been shaped by the COVID‑19 pandemic, the acceleration of artificial intelligence, the Russia–Ukraine war, renewed violence in Israel–Palestine, and shifts in US leadership, all of which amplify pressure on democratic systems. Across the Balkans and the wider EU, from Romania’s anti‑corruption marches to Serbia’s anti‑Vučić protests and the rise of populists in core member states, democracies are being tested.

As Bulgaria heads into yet another election, it stands between perpetual fragmentation and gradual institutional renewal. Whether the energy of #GenZRevolution and similar movements matures into durable reform will determine not only the country’s trajectory, but also what it comes to symbolise within a changing European order: a cautionary example of democratic erosion, or a laboratory for democratic reinvention under pressure.

The Bulgarian lesson, then, is universal: democracies cannot defend themselves abroad if they decay at home.

Works Cited

1. Political crisis, elections, turnout, party system

Iren Marinova & Rickard Lindholm, “Bulgaria: Political Crisis With No End in Sight?”, Wilson Center, 18 Dec 2024 / updated 2025.[5g.wilsoncenter]​

– Used for: “eighth election since April 2021”, recurring snap elections and caretaker governments, erosion of trust, rise of radical/right‑wing forces, vulnerability to external influence.

OSCE/ODIHR, Elections in Bulgaria (mission reports for April 2021, July 2021, Nov 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024).[osce]​

– Used for: description of electoral system (PR, 240 MPs, 31 districts, 4% threshold, closed lists), comments on frequent last‑minute electoral law changes, concerns over machine voting, counting, and trust.

“April 2021 Bulgarian parliamentary election”, Wikipedia (summary of official data).[en.wikipedia]​

– Used for: six parties in parliament, GERB–SDS winning 25.8% and 75/240 seats.

“Elections in Bulgaria”, Wikipedia (overview).[en.wikipedia]​

– Used for: sequence and dates of the 2021–2024 elections and basic institutional setup.

“Bulgaria’s June 2024 elections: Voter turnout 34.41% for National Assembly, 33.79% for European Parliament”, The Sofia Globe, 11 June 2024.[sofiaglobe]​

– Used for: exact turnout figures 2021–2024 (49.1%, 40.39%, 38.43%, 40.69%, 34.41%) and note that this is the lowest since 1991.

Eurostat demographic data on Bulgaria (population loss since 2007).[wilsoncenter]​

– Used for: claim that the population has fallen by about 900,000 compared with 2007 and that Bulgaria is among the steepest demographic decliners in the EU.

2. Trust, apathy, “no party represents us”

Marinova & Lindholm, “Bulgaria: Political Crisis With No End in Sight?”, Wilson Center.[5g.wilsoncenter]​

– Used for: low trust in parliament and parties (only around a third), over half saying “no party represents them”, and general narrative of disillusionment, apathy, and support for anti‑establishment options.

Gallup International / Gallup International Balkan – as cited in Wilson Center and national media.[5g.wilsoncenter]​

– Used for: figure that c. 65% of Bulgarians believe their vote “does not matter”.

3. Media capture, Peevski, information environment

Reporters Without Borders (RSF), World Press Freedom Index 2023 – Bulgaria country profile.[dw]​

– Used for: Bulgaria ranked 91/180 and last in the EU; discussion of media concentration, opaque ownership, and Peevski‑linked outlets.

Deutsche Welle, “Bulgaria protests: ‘Gen Z won’t stay silent!’”, 3 Dec 2025.[dw]​

– Used both for:

– description of Peevski’s perceived role in corruption and media capture;

– depiction of protest slogans, youth participation, and media/online context.

Alpha Research trust‑in‑media polling (as cited in domestic coverage and think‑tank work).[wilsoncenter]​

– Used for: figure that roughly 28% of Bulgarians trust television news.

4. #GenZRevolution, protests, Radev/Zhelyazkov resignations

Deutsche Welle, “Bulgaria protests: ‘Gen Z won’t stay silent!’”, 3 Dec 2025.[dw]​

– Used for: character of the protests, generational profile, slogans (“Gen Z won’t stay silent”), numbers and spread across cities, broad anti‑corruption and anti‑Peevski framing.

Deutsche Welle, “Bulgaria protests: Why did Gen Z turn out in record numbers?”, 10 Dec 2025.[dw]​

– Used for: triggering by controversial budget and cost‑of‑living; record‑level youth turnout; social media metrics; message “You have angered the wrong generation”.

The New York Times, “‘Did We Do That?’ Gen Z Protesters Help Tip Balance Against Bulgaria’s Leaders”, 12 Dec 2025.[nytimes]​

– Used for: line that protests “helped tip the balance” or “helped unseat” the government; description of Rosen Zhelyazkov’s resignation; framing of this as a political awakening for young Bulgarians.

Reuters, “Bulgaria faces turmoil after protests topple government on eve of euro entry”, 11 Dec 2025.[reuters]​

– Used for: timing (eve of euro entry), protests as immediate cause of government resignation, and link to continuing instability.

ZOiS (Centre for East European and International Studies), “Why Bulgaria Became a Success Story for the Gen Z Protests”, ZOiS Spotlight, 22 Jan 2026.[zois-berlin]​

– Used for: characterisation of Bulgaria as a “success story” of Gen‑Z‑led protests; the point that the government resigned within less than three weeks; generational framing (“children of the transition” vs Gen Z).

Open Society Institute – Sofia, youth engagement survey Jan 2026 (as cited in ZOiS/Wilson Center).

– Used for: figure that 57% of 18–29‑year‑olds now express interest in participating in elections, about 20‑point increase from 2023.

5. Parties, polling, Vazrazhdane, Radev’s potential

June 2024 Bulgarian parliamentary election, Wikipedia / national polling coverage.[en.wikipedia]​

– Used for: Vazrazhdane polling in low‑to‑mid teens and consolidating third place.

Wilson Center piece and follow‑up polling synthesis.[5g.wilsoncenter]​

– Used for: narrative that anti‑corruption projects (ITN, PP) surged then faltered; continued strength of GERB and DPS; rise of radical/right‑wing parties.

MarketLinks / Bulgarian polling agencies (e.g. Market Links, Alpha Research, Trend) – February 2026 polls as reported in local media and think‑tank summaries.[wilsoncenter]​

– Used for: estimates that a Radev‑aligned formation might win c. 30–32%, with GERB at 11–14% and Vazrazhdane 10–13%.

6. Euro adoption, Lukoil, wider EU/global context

ECPR’s The Loop, Albrecht Rothacher & Martin Bull, “Is Bulgaria really ready for the euro?”, 1 July 2025.[theloop.ecpr]​

– Used for: expectation of joining the eurozone in 2026, and the political/economic sensitivity of euro adoption.

Reuters, “Bulgaria faces turmoil after protests topple government on eve of euro entry”, 11 Dec 2025.[reuters]​

– Used again for: linkage between protests, government fall, and timing relative to euro entry.

General EU/NATO and populism context from Wilson Center and comparative commentary.[5g.wilsoncenter]​

– Used for: tying Bulgaria’s case to broader European trends (AfD, Le Pen, Meloni, etc.) and Russia–Ukraine war, democratic strain, and external influence.