Belarus’ place in the Russia-Ukraine war

Phoebe Lang-Clapp is a second year International Social and Political Studies student. She is primarily interested in international conflict and security studies.  

Introduction 

Now in early 2025, any follower of the Russo-Ukraine war developments could be under no illusion about which way Belarus swings. Besides its longstanding allegiance with Russia, Belarus has become increasingly implicated in the course of the war itself. 

In December, Belarussian President Lukashenko stated that his state had acquired Russian Oreshnik missiles, with plans for their deployment from Belarus. [1] The President insisted, perhaps unconvincingly to the onlooker, that Belarus retained significant agency in the use of instruments deployed from its territory,

‘Belarus will determine the targets, not Russia…In other words, we will press the button together, if necessary, God forbid. We will determine the targets ourselves.’ [2] 

It is difficult to ascertain if Lukashenko truthfully believes he has the facility to preserve Belarussian sovereignty. He certainly seems insistent. If he has an understanding of the states’ relationship as one defined by mutual benefit, Putin and Lukashenko may have quite different perceptions of events. It is unlikely, however, that Lukashenko could arrive at this conclusion at this stage. The asymmetry is too great. 

Belarussian leadership

Has Belarussian backing always been so forthcoming? Bluntly, no. Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 provided a kind of brutal test run to gauge the level of support of the former Soviet states for what constituted a then-unprecedented level of Russian expansionism. Shraibman argues that Lukashenko, through his ambiguous stance and lack of surefootedness in permanently supporting either Western criticism of the annexation or Russian claims to Crimea, ‘[forged] a middle position’, apparently so successful that sanctions were lifted by the West [3]. Lukashenko’s ability to maintain a relationship with both Russia and the West at once has surely been tested to the limit following the unequivocal condemnation of the 2022 Russian invasion by the West. The international community has afforded Lukashenko little room for manoeuvre outside of this ultimatum. 

Upholding Belarussian sovereignty appears, quite logically, a tenet of the policy of Belarussian leadership since the advent of its independence in 1991. Shushkevich, who headed the newly independent state immediately after it seceded from the USSR, held Belarussian sovereignty as a priority, as well as a commitment to fostering relationships with international institutions. [4] Lukashenko, the first and only President of the formally established Republic of Belarus, has similarly reiterated his devotion to Belarussian sovereignty, but these pledges appear somewhat undermined by what seems like his very visible exploitation by his chief, Putin. 

A profile of Belarus 

Belarus remains striking both in its internal and external dimensions. Its intimacy with Russia today stands out within the former Soviet bloc. A study by Shapiro measuring the degree of voting alignment - vis-à-vis the Russian stance - of all of the former Soviet states found that Belarus consistently voted with the closest alignment to Russia. Shapiro states that despite early notions of neutrality, Belarus subsequently ‘leant towards Russia more than just about any other country in the world.’ [5] 

Yet, Belarus’ distinctiveness is not a new phenomenon. Balmaceda argues that historically, the Soviet system worked remarkably well in Belarus: it had a tangible lack of ‘underground opposition’ [4] which facilitated its acceptance of Soviet rule. In 2024, it sets itself apart in its position towards Russia. Within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) formed of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikstan, Lukashenko is somewhat of an outlier. Ambrosio highlights that besides Belarus, all other constituent members of the treaty have sought to ameliorate ties with the West and China. [6] 

The path of ever-proximate Russian-Belarussian relations may be self-perpetuating, though, and unidirectional, if events cause Belarus to continually cede control. Astapenia highlights that Western sanctions revoked Belarussian access to EU ports, resulting in its increased reliance on Russian ports. [7] Huterer and Sahm show that trends, which would suggest an improvement of asymmetries in Belarus’ economic relationship with Russia, are superficial, underlining that when accounting for the technicality that such exports are forced to divert first through Russian infrastructure before reaching the third state, Russia accounts for a 90% share of its exports. [8] The pattern of reliance is indisputable.

A union of fear, or mutual benefit?

Russian-Belarussian integration appears to be moving decisively in one direction. Lukashenko is undoubtedly aware of the would-be implications of defection from his supervisor. What’s in it for Belarus? Marin argued in 2020 that the only incentive for Belarussian integration would be favourable conditions for the purchase of Russian oil and gas. [9] The price to pay for such concessions is high, though: reductions of such tariffs have historically been coupled with the condition that Belarus accepts integration into a kind of supranational ‘Union State’ as demarcated in the Union State Treaty of 1999, and as re-proposed by then-Prime Minister Medvedev in 2018. [10] Talks surrounding the implementation of ‘roadmaps’ - essentially integration proposals - as provided by the treaty have resulted in deadlock over Belarussian concerns that it would be forced to cede unreasonable levels of autonomy. [9] Yet the underlying tone of Russian expansionism will be recognised all too clearly by Lukashenko, even notwithstanding the unrealised union state. Writing today, as the Russ0-Ukraine war has now been running for over 30 months, this fear should only have intensified. Ambrosio argued that states, including Belarus, refused to withdraw from the CSTO because doing so would have given Russia a mandate to intervene, as an attempt to ‘keep one’s (potential) enemies closer.’ [6] Marin hypothesises that, ‘a hybrid action’ or ‘Crimean scenario in order to fully vassalise Belarus’ should not be ruled out. [9] Lukashenko must be motivated, chiefly, by fear. 

The domestic picture

It is important to consider the attitudes of the Belarussian population to what appears to be Lukashenko’s indeterminate descent into submission regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war. The memory of the leadership’s brutal repression of any political opposition in 2020 and 2021 is all too fresh and highlights the undercurrent of the anti-establishment sentiment in the state, and its ability to mobilise. Chatham House survey data revealed that in March 2023, a significantly greater proportion of surveyed Belarussians opposed Russian activity in Ukraine rather than supported it, with a combined 33% somewhat or definitely supporting Putin’s military operation, compared to a combined 44% somewhat or definitely opposing it, with 24% unsure. [11] Whether the disconnect between public opinion and the actions of Lukashenko is strong enough to elicit another round of brutal contestation is the question. Opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya recently called for renewed mobilisation with the explicit purpose of dismantling the regime. [12] Given the marked resolve of previous anti-authoritarianists, the eruption of another protest movement cannot be ruled out. 

Conclusion

To conclude, the relationship between Russia and Belarus increasingly resembles one of domination and submission. The repeated insistence of Lukashenko that his state retains sovereignty and bargaining power with respect to Russia feel feeble. As the fear of invasion feels - rightly or wrongly - increasingly proximate, Lukashenko is likely not to want to rock the boat with a policy of anything other than deference. If Putin wants to deploy missiles from Belarus, he will deploy those missiles. 

Bibliography

[1] Ewing, G.R. (2024). Putin sending Russia’s new hypersonic missiles to Belarus. [online] POLITICO. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-russia-hypersonic-oreshnik-missiles-belarus-aleksandr-lukashenko/.

[2] Belarusian Telegraph Agency. (2024). Lukashenko: Belarus is choosing sites for Oreshnik. [online] Available at: https://eng.belta.by/president/view/lukashenko-belarus-is-choosing-sites-for-oreshnik-163803-2024/ [Accessed 30 Dec. 2024].

[3] Shraibman, A. (2016). The Lukashenko Formula: Belarus’s Crimea Flip-Flops. [online] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2016/04/the-lukashenko-formula-belaruss-crimea-flip-flops?lang=en¢er=russia-eurasia [Accessed 30 Dec. 2024].

[4] Balmaceda, M.M. (2014). Living the high life in Minsk : Russian energy rents, domestic populism and Belarus’ impending crisis. Budapest ; New York: Central European University Press.

[5] Shapiro, D. (2023). Year two of the invasion: Where do former Soviet countries stand? Euro-Atlantic Security Policy Brief. [online] Available at: https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/23_06_23_Daniel-Shapiro-policy-brief.pdf.

[6] Ambrosio, T. (2024). The CSTO: A Lifeless, Shambling ‘Alliance’ | GJIA. [online] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. Available at: https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/03/04/the-collective-security-treaty-organization-a-lifeless-shambling-alliance/.

[7] Astapenia, R. (2023). Russia’s war on Ukraine has strengthened Lukashenka but undermined Belarus. [online] Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank. Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/12/russias-war-ukraine-has-strengthened-lukashenka-undermined-belarus.

[8] Huterer, M. and Sahm, A. (2024). Belarus: Sovereignty under Threat. [online] Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Available at: https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2024C22.

[9] Marin, A. (2020). UNDER PRESSURE. Can Belarus resist Russian coercion? [online] (15). Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342946218_UNDER_PRESSURE_Can_Belarus_resist_Russian_coercion.

[10] Shraibman, A. (2021). How to Build a Union: View of Societies and Elites in Russia and Belarus | An Ever Closer Union?[online] Clingendael.org. Available at: https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2021/an-ever-closer-union/annex-1/ [Accessed 30 Dec. 2024].

[11] Chatham House (2023). Fifteenth survey wave. [online] Belaruspolls.org. Available at: https://en.belaruspolls.org/wave-15 [Accessed 30 Dec. 2024].

[12] Starcevic, S. (2024). Be ready to take to streets to overthrow Lukashenko, Belarus opposition leader urges. [online] POLITICO. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/belarus-opposition-leader-sviatlana-tsikhanouskaya-election-protests-alexander-lukashenko/.